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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUC'rION
John Henry Newman was born in London on February 21, 1801. He was

..

brought up in a sort of bible religion of the type common in England at that
time.

In 1808 he was sent to a private school in Ealing.

read Tom Paine's tracts

ag~inst

the Old

Test~ent,

Aa a youth he

some ot Hume's eseays,

and some French verses denying the immortality ot the soul.

1

Such reading

however did not influence the yr)Ung Newman as deeply a8 did hie reading of
evan,gel1cal writers such as l;¥illiam Romaine (1714-1795) and Thomas Scott
(174l-l82l).

In the Aeologia

Neh~an

aaya that he practically owee hie
2
soul, humanly speaking, to Thomas :')cott.
';'ihi1e at Ealing Newman experlenced a religlnus conversion which
intellectual convictions.

WAS

not merely emotional but involved

Newman in his autobiographical memoir say. that

one of the teachers at Eal1ng, Reverend vislter Mayer, gav, him "deep
religioue impreSSions, at the time Calvinistic in character, which were to
him the beginning ot a new life.";

t Cf. John Henry Newman Apologia]£g ~~, London, Oxford
edi tion, 1913, 107. Thh book wll1 be referrf~d to as Aeo1ogi. in these notes.

2

ll!!.,

108.

; Letters ~ Correspondence
London, 1891. I, 27.

~ ~

1

Henri Newman. ed. by Anne Mozley,

2.

I\tter eight and a halt' years at ;:;aling, Newman left tor Trinity College
at Oxford.

At Oxford 1n 1822 he won an Oriel Fellowship. Wilfrid Ward 4

pOints out that this was the turning point in Newman's lite. Newman himself
says this of the Oriel Fellowship:
It opened upon him a theologIcal career, placing him upon the high
and broad platform of University society and intelligence, and bringing him across those various influences, personal and intellectual,
and the teaching of thoae various schools of ecclesiastical thought,
whereby the religious sentiment in his mind ••• was gradually .
deve loped and formed and brought on to its legitimate ieeues. 5
The men of Oriel, such as Whately, Hawkins, and Blanco Jhlte, influenced
Newman much, even though he reacted against their religious liberalism and
rationalism.

Of' 'whately, Newman says, "He, emphatically, opened my mind,

and taught me to think and to use my reason. II 6

From the Oriel Fellows,

Newman learned religious toleratton and the need for definiteness 1n
religious matters as opposed to the vagueness of the evangelicals.
Oriel Fellows, however, placed too much

emph~sis

The

on reasoning in theology,

and because of thi a tact they later were known as the Noetic ••
In 1824 and l82~ Newman received Orders in the Church of England, and
became a curate at :3t. Clement'. Church, Oxford. In 1828 he

4 Wiltrid Ward, .D!!. !4!!.
1921, I, ~.

.2!.

WaB

appointed.

~ Henry Newman, London,

~ Mozley, Letters, I, 7~: Newman wrote this memoir u8ing pronouns
or the third person to refer to himself.

6 Apologia, 114.

lVicar of't. )ijary1a.
Iurrell Froude.
~ese

In this year Newman became a I'llore intimate friend of

Through Froude, he also became friendly with John Keble.

friendships were extremely important in Newman's development.

Also

in 1828 Newman began to read systematically the Fathers of the ::':hurch.

They

were a great influence on his philoeophiciii1 and thf301ogical thcmght, especially in regard to the nature 01: the universe and the nature of t.he Church.
Later in life Newman said, nThe Fathers made me a Catholic. n7
In 18;52 Newman traveled about the Mediterranean.
contracted a rever which brought him near death.
~ever

1tihile in Sicily he

Despite the severity of hie

he believed that he would not die, and he also believed that God had

some special work for him to do. 8 When Bewman returned to England in July
of IS" he found hie work.

The disestablishment of the Church of England

seemed imminent; ten Iri8h bishoprics had been suppressed.

Froude, Keble

and Palmer had already pledged themselves to write and associate in defense
of the Church, I'lnd Newman joined them wholeheartedly.
Keble preached his famouB sermon "The National
desire to toresake the Church.

On July 14,

Aposta8~"

In September of 18"

18;;,

about England's

the "Tracts for the

Times" began to be published, and the Oxford or Tractarian Movement wae well
on its way.

Thie If:OVement waB against diee.tabUahment, but 1t was more

fundamentally a call to holinesl, and to a return to the primitive and
apostolic Christianity, and to dogma and scientific theology.

7 Newman, Lectures ~ Certain Difficulties Felt ~ Anglicans, II, 24,
as quoted in Harrold, ~ Henry Newman, London, i945, 18.

a

Of. Apologia, 1,5.

4.
Newman gained eminence at Oxford through bis leadership of the Oxford
In 18'9 however he began to

Movement end through his tracts and sermons.

doubt the validity of the Church of England! his study of the

l<~onophyaite8,

and an article by \{iseman on the Donathts were the immediate causes of his
doubts. Newman

the similarity of the Church of England to the schisms
9
of the MonophysUes and Oonet1ete.
In 1841 Newman published Tract .2.Q
SaW

which examined the Thirty-nine Article. of the English Church, and tried to
show that they agreed with the Roman Catholic creed and were enacted only
against popular errore and exaggerations.

Newman thought that by this

tract he had vindicated the claim of the English Church to Oatholicity.
Because of Tract 2Q Newman was ordered by Bishop Bagot to discontinue
the aeriee of tracts.
of Littlemore.

In 1842 Newman left Oxford and moved to the seclusion

In 184, he resigned his fellowship at Oriel.

At Littlemore

from 1842 to 1845 Newman studied the hiatory of doctrine and ita development,
and prepared his

~esgr ~

published late in 1845.

l!!

Development

~

Christian Doctrine, which was

The study which he did in preparing this work helped

to convince him that the Roman Catholic Ohurch was the true Church ot Christ.
On October 8, 1845, Newman was received into the Roman Catholic Church
by Fr. Dominic Barberi, an Italian Paseion1et.

In 1847 Newman wee ordained

a priest in Rome, and shortly thereafter he entered the Congregation of the
Orato,ry.

He returned to England and founded Oratorie. in London and

5.
In 1851 Newman WaS picked to be the first Hector of

tt:gb8ston (Birmingham).

the Ca.thoUc University in Dublin, but he received 11 ttle cooperati.on in thie
He failed in hie work on the University, but

work.

.Ih.! .!.S!.£ £! !. University

was the result of' Nth/man's intellectual efforts in this matter.
In 1864 Ne~tman wrote his Apologia pro ~ ~ in answer to attacka on
him by Charles Kingeley.
Grammar

~

Assent.

In 1870 Newman published his

1:; 138 11

.!n .ill .2!

A

This work was in answer to a problem that waB most im-

portant to him from his days at Oriel and throughout his life, the problem
of the relation of reason and faith.
Through much of his life in the Catholtc Church, Newman encountered
opposition and suspicion trom the Oatholic heirarchy.

Newman'. plane tor the

Irish UniverSity, tor an Oxford Oratory, tor a new translation of the bible,
and for working with a certain Catholic periodical were all opposed by hi.

superiors.

Newman

a Catholic must

WaS

ha~

very sensitive and the many' reverses he sutfered

hurt him deeply.

suspicion of Newman was necessitated
Cardinal in 1879.

However, the end
~y

or

as

any ecolesiastical

Leo XIII when he made Newman a

When Newman learned that he waB to be made a Cardinal

he said, "The cloud is litted from me for ever. nlO
John Henry Newman, like most philosophers, received the philosophical
problems on which he

10. 'lIard,

~,

WeS

to work from his SOCiety and friends. The baeic

II, 446.

6.
cauee of the philosophical problems which Newman encountered in his society
was rationalism. Beekraad says that the rationalism of this perlod in
England was "not

.30

much a doctrina as a. mode of thinking, an empbasis laid

on the human mind as the faculty of reasoning, to the neglect of all other
elements. t!

11

'I'll. only type of reasoning

~ihich

this rationalism recognized

was formal and mechanical; the optimistic rationalists believed thgt with
such an automatic tool man's reason would be unerring.
the spirit of rationalism had three main results:

In religious matters

~;videntialismt

scientific

scepticism, and sentimentalism.
According to Evidentiallem a man's faith was only a8 good as the
evidencea Bnd proofs which he could advance for it.

Evidentialism made the

assent of faith into a rather mechanical and inhuman conclusion to a ayllogismo
~

The chief exponent ot Evidentlalism was William Paley.

Evidences

~

--

Hie View. of

Ohristianity, P9bllshed in 1794, became the exemplar of the

ti;vident1e.liat outlook on religion.

Newman encountered

i~vident1ali8m

at

Oxford and in the Oriel College. It WaS SAid Ulat the Common Room of Oriel
12
College "stank of logio. 1t
Rationalism had led the Oriel fellows not only
toward Evidentialism but also toward a more rationalistic (or Itliberal n ) outlook on other parts of theology in addition to apologetics.

Newman saw that

reasonable nnd logical men could investigate the evidences for Christianity
and for God, end still remain doubtful; furthermore, he

.s:

SaW

the Evidentialist

11 A.J • Beeleraad, !b! Personal Conquest
Truth according 12 !2h.!!
Herlry Newman, LOUvain, 1955, 74.
--12. Zeno.~ Henri Newman, .2!£.!!a.l 12 Cert,itude,Leiden,1957. p.v. of
Introduction; quotation taken fraa Wh1tridge,~. Arnold ~ Rugby, 16~.

7.
method of arriving at faith to be at variance with hie own personal experience.

In his Grammar

~

Assent he said, nIf I am asked to use Paley's

argument for my own conversion, I say plainly I do not want to be converted
by a smart sy110giem. n1 ,
The second result of rationalism, also found at Oxford, and also with
consequences in the religious sphere, was scientlsm or scientific scepticism.
Scientific scepticism transfers the attitudes and methode which are required
for science to ell other fields; the result is that certainty in any field
can be attained only through explicit proofs of the type used in mathematieal physics.

~ven

if such proofs are had, there still may remain a duty

for the investigator to remain open to any further facts which may invalidate
the proofs; therefore the advocate of scientific scepticism, in order to
maintain a mind that is open and fair to facti, must f'orego certainty and be
content with a high degree of probability.

Nicolaus Theis saye that Newton

and Locke were the intellectual lights of Oxford in Newman's time, and
II

philosophy had experienced a breaking-in of the mathematical method, and

developed into geometry of the mind. 1114

Newman'e friend, ~'illiam Froude,

younger brother of Harrell Froude, was an outstanding scientist and a
scientific sceptic.

In a

lette~

to Newman he states his position that the

human mind is not capable of arriving at an absolutely certain conclusion.

13 Newman,
London,

~

Essay

~!!a ~~

Grammar

1947, ,2,.This book will hereafter

~

IS

Assent, ed. by C.F. Harrold,
9! in these notes.

be referred to as

14 Theis, Nicolaus, ~An den Quellen dee Pere&nlichen Dankens f Einf6hrung
in J.H. Newman's 'Grammar of Assent,'· Newman Studien,lI, N~nberg, 1954, 167
15 Harper, G.li. Cardinal Newman
pondence, Baltimore, 19", 119-120.

.!!!2. ';;Ul1am Froude ,_F .!i..§!. •

.! Oorres-

Net~mfln

became thoroughly acquainted ltd th scientific scepticism through a

long correspondence '?,hieh he andaUiam Froude carried on.
The third result of rationalism in the religious sphere

WaS

a sort of

sentimentalism which mak.es religion into a matter of taste or emotions.
cause a void had been left in the religious

lJe-

sphere through scientific ecept-

ichm's doctrine that reason cannot attain certitude about religious matters,
many tried to fill this void with the power of human emotions.

The truth or

validity of a religion is then judged on the baaie of how it suite one's taste
and emotions.

Perhaps the reduction of religious belief to a mAtter of

sentiment can Also be viewed as a reaction againat EvidentiaUem'e overemphasis of reaeon and reduction of religious belief to a eyllogistic conelusion.

Newman found this sentimentalism in religion among Evangelicals

and also among some "liberal" theologians whom he knew.

He saw the falsity

and the dangers in this attitude toward faith, and combatted it throughout
his life.

In a speech which he gave in Rome on the occasion of receiving

the off'icial announcement that he had beli:n made a Cardinal, Newman said this
about religious liberaliem:
For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resiated to the best of my
powers the spirit of Liberalism in religion • • • • Liberalism in
religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion,
but that one creed i8 as good 8S another • • • • Rev,aled religion
1s not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; • • • • 10
One of the purposes at the Oxford Movement had been to oppose the growing
tendency to treat religion as emotional and non-intellectual.
In

l~vident1al1sm,

scientific scepticism, and sentimentalism, Newman met

challenges to his own faith.

16 Ward, Life

I

II, 460.

All three of theee results of rationalism made

him investigate the true relation of reason and faith.

This relationship

waS first studied by Newman 1n his Oxford University sermons, which
while he was an Anglican.

we~

given

For a long time he planned to develop more fully

hie thought on the reason-faith problem.
thought on this problem was

The result ot all of Newman'.

An Ess'y!n ~ ~~ Gr~ ~

A8sent. 17 Shortly

after its publication in 1870, Newman wrote in a letter to Fr. Coleridge:
"for 20 or ,0 years I have felt it a sort of duty to write upon it r=the subject of the Grammar ~ AS8en~ and I have begun again and again but never
could get on." 18

Not only had Newman spent much time in thinking about

the subject ot the Grammar

~

Aseent, but he also coneidered this work to be

his last word on the subject: "1 have written and rewritten it more times
than I could count.

I have got up to my highest point -- 1 mean, I could

not do better, did I spend a century on it, but then, it may be 'bad is the
best.' n 19

17 Newman gives this explanation of the title: "You 8ee, I called lt
en Easay, as it really le, because it is an analytical inquiry. A Grammar
ought to be synthetical. But to put it in synthetical form, had I after all
attempted it, would have been to write a new book. And it would, to my own
teelings, hav~ been bumptious." (letter to Canon Walker at April 8, 1870,
quoted in 8oekraad, Personal Conquest, 191). Walgrave pOinte out that
Newman intended to desoribe the struoture ot thought and disoover the mechanism and movement of it, using thought itselt as hie starting pOint, in the
same way ae grammar derivee the lawe of language tram current use (J.ri.
WalgravB, Newman lh! Theologian, t~w York, 1960, 62).
18

Ward, Life, II, 268,

19

Ibid,. 262.

10.
In the GraltDlar

~

Assent Newml3n shows that reason is

othe~~r

than what

the Evidentialiste and scientlric sceptics 8ay it ie; therefore there i8 no
need for a sentimentalism to tske over the sphere of religion.

Behind theae

three views is a talse rationslism which makes human reasoning into a formal,
mechanical prooess.

The main purpose of the Grammar of Assent 1. to show how

reason, in its true meaning, hee a ri,ghtful plece in our way ot arriving at
religious f'al tho

In order to show the reb.til:,nehi p of reB80n to f&1th,

Newman hed to analyze the nature of reasoning in man.

The purpose or this

thesis 1e to study this analysis of' reasoning.
It should be kept in mind trom the start that Newman's theory of
reasoning in the Grammar
was it meant to be such.
to a particular type:
conolusion.

~

Assent is not a complete theory of reasoning, nor

H~s

development of a theory of reasoning ia limited

reaeoning which results in a concrete and individual

This limitation of his reasoning theory is shown by many ex-

pliCit statements and all ()f' hie examples in hie treetment of reascming,20
and also by his ultimate purpose, as shown by the last chapter of the

Assent, an application ot hie reasoning theory to a question of
21
concrete taet, whether or not the Ohristian religion i8 from GOd.

Grammar

~

20 E.g.,

QA,

204, 211, 212, 219, 222, 251.

CHAPTF.:R 11

There ere good reasons for beginning a study of' Newman's doctrine on
reasoning with a consideration of' f'ormel inference.

First of' all, Newman

undertook hie study of reasoning in reaction against a rationa11sm which
he.d reduced reasl")ning to e f'ormal, mechanical process;
tQTmal interence presents such
in the Grammar

E!

8

his doctrine of'

mechanical view of' reasoning. Secondly,

Assent, Newman considers formal inference f1rst,and then

proceeds to consider natural and informal inference, both of which go beyond
formal interence.
in the trammer

E!

;:ince Newman's thought, both historically and as he writes
Assent, proceeds from a consideration of formal inference

and ita inadequacies to

B

consideration of concrete reasoning as we actually

find it in man, this seme order will be tollowed in this thesis.
The first point to be considered is what interence and form.l inference
meant to Newman.

Inference in general f'or him signifies the conditional

acceptance ot a proposition.

1

It i8 conditional because a proposition ia

accepted on the condition of an acceptance of its premisses. 2
thie simply: It',ve reason when we hold this by virtue of' that. It '

1 QA, 119, 197.
2

.!.:2!.!!.,

,

Ibid., 197.

57.

11

Newman states

12.
Formal interence, which Newman sometimes calls "logical interence" or
4
simply "interence", 1s ratiocination reatricted and put into groove •• 0 that
the mind will not run wild, but will advance with precie10n and effect. 5
Ratiocination is placed into orderly groove. through the uee of words; in this
6
way language i8 treated as though it ha. 8 monopolyof' thought.
Formal
interence, therefore, is reasoning aa it is marked out by words, propositiona,
end syllogisms; it is verbal reasoning as opposed to mental

rea.oning~

and

logic is its scientific form. 7
Formal inference is far more concerned with the comparison of propositions
than with the propositions themeelves. 8 Formal interence must regard propos1tions not in relation to their own truth, or falsity, but in relation to their
mutual consistency.

Since the concern of formal inference is with the com-

parison ot propositions, whatever makes this comparieon easier and more
accurate will aid formal interence.

If' the words used in formal inference

are made more Simple, definite, and narrow they will make comparison eaBier
and more accurate and thus benefit the formal interence.

The fliore that word.

and propositions are made to express "exact, intelligible, comprehensible,
communicable notions" and the less they stand for objective thing', so much

~ore suitable they become tor formal tnterenoe. 9 Since symbols, unlike words,

!ill-,
!ill., 200.
6 !ill.
4
5

E.g.,

-

7 Ibid.
8 !lli., 201.
9 llli·

,1,

69, 200.

1;.
are most exact and constant in their meanings, they are the beet meane or
conducting the formal process of reasoning. 10 After Newman hae concluded
that symbols are most apt as members of syllogistic reasoning, he states the
consequence of this foct on the meaning of words in .yllogisms:
Symbolical notRtion, then, being the perfection of the syllogistic
method, it follows that, when words ere substituted for symbols
it will be its aim to circumscribe and stint their import 88 much
as pOSSible, lest perehanee A should not always exactly mean A,
and B mean B; and to make them, as much as possible, the calculi
or notions, which are in our absolute power, ae meaning just what
we choose them tf mean, and as little ae possible the tokens of
real things ••••• 1
Herein is contained one of Newman's fundamental tenet. on the nature

or

formal inference: in order that formal inference may accurately compare
propositions, it must have a narrowness of meaning, and a lack of the depth
of reality.
However, Newman is not entirely unravoranle to formal inference..
Oxford University Sermons, he calle Aristotelian

In hie

logic (a scientific form of

formal inference) the "boldest, simplest, and moat comprehensive theory which
has been invented for the analysis of the re.soning process."12 In tne
Grammar .2! Assent Newman even states that formal inference 18 someWhat
natural to man: we think in logic as we talk in prose, without aiming at
doing so, and we instinctively put our conclusions into words a8 far a8 we
are able. 1,
10

Newman finds formal inference useful ae a scientific method, a

1..2!!.,
~.J

201-202.

202-20,.
12 Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached before ~ University ~ Oxford,
London, 1884, 258. In the Same sermon however, he 8ays that logic is mainly a orit1cal and negative teet of reasoning. (Ibid.,276) •
1, GA... 218.
11

14.
principle of order, and an intellectual standard.

M

Ii

scientific method it

enables us to progress beyond what gifted intellects cac,lld do

by

their own

unaided power;l4 it helps us in finding and verifying conclusions; it shows us
the coherence or weakness of a theory, and where further experiment and ob-

ser~tion are necessary.l5 As the great principle of order in thinking,
formal interenoe

the accumulations of knowl.dge and maps out the
relations of the eeparate departments of knowledge. 16 As an intellectual
cata~ogues

standard, formal inference helps in providing a common measure between minda,
thereby treeing us from the capricious ipse dixit of aUthority.l7
Despite ell these usee of formal interence which Newman mentions, his
usual attitude in the Grammar
favorable criticism.

~

Assent toward formal inference is one of un-

He finds that formal inference haS these deficiencies:

<a> it does not prove its premisses; (b) it does not reach the concrete and
individual in its conolusions; (0) it is verbal and therefore inadequate in
representing thought.
(a) In a sermon given in

l8~9,

more than thirty years before the pub-

lication of the Grammar of Assent, Newman said that in any proof "there must
ever be snmething assumed ultimately incapable ofproot'.1118
14 .!.ill.. , 198 •
15 .!!'!!f. , 229, 217.
16 .!.ill.. , 217.
17 ,!lli., 199, 217, 275.
18

New'lDan, Oxford Univere1 ty Sermons, 21;.

In another

15.
sermon, preached in 1840, he stresses the importance of anteoedent view8 and
presumptions in relation to formal proofs: the strength of the proof depends
on whether the presumptions are accepted or n'it. 19

In the Grammar !!! Assent

.Newman holds that if we follow '1er hal argumentation beck to 1 ts starting
points we find first principles which are "tha recondite sourC"1 of knowledge, ae to which logic provides no common measure of minds. 20 • These first
principles are rejected by some and accepted by others, end in them liea the
whole problem .t attaining to truth; we are not able to prove by syllogism
that there are any self-evident tirst principles at all, and therefore,
syllogisMS miss the most important part in the proceee of attaining truth. 21
Many

types of aesumptions that must be presupposed during formal infer-

eneee are mentioned by Newman. 22

Even in the most direct and levere kind of

formal interence there must be thoee aesumptions in the process which are
baaed on the conditions of human nature: our nature itself and our method of
reasoning are assumptions.

In le.s strict reasoning such as reasoning on

conorete matters, there are assumptions that are quite subtle.

These assump-

tions may arise from the sentiments of the age. country, religion, eocial
habits and ideas of the particular inquirers or disputants.

Because such

assumptions may be admitted by all, they can pass and be accepted without

19

.!.2!.!t.,

20.

.Q,!, 205.

21

ll.!!.

22

llli.,

273.

286; 205-206, 208.

16.
detection..

Another type of assumption arises from the nature of the case

which is being treated: some cases might require assumptions to be made because of the tediousness of the proof in full, or because the full pr()of'
would be
it down.

80

immenee in size that it would be practically impossible

to write

Yet another type of assumption, and undoubtedly the moat important

ot all, is the personal assumption.

Such assumptions are baaed in the in-

tellectual, moral, and emotional charaoter of the individual person. No
matter what the basis of an assumption may be, tormal inference 18 unable
to prove the truth of it.
by itself

~ould

Beoause of this impotenoe alone, formal inference

have to admit to uncertainty in its conolusions.

However,

in addition to its weakness at its beginnings, it ie found also to have
another essential weakness at its oonclusionr this 1s it. inab1l1ty to reach
in its conclusions the concrete and ind1vidual.
(b)

The inability of tormal inference to reach the concrete and individ-

ual tallows from the nature of the terms that are used in formal 1nference.
According to Newman, each term in fommal inference

is narrowed down in mean-

ing lIeo that it may stand tor just one unreal a.pect of the concrete thing to
which it properly belonge, tor a relation, a generalization, or other abetractiona, tor a notion neatly turned out of the laboratory of the mind. and suffiCiently tame and subdued because existing only 1n a defin1tlon.~2;

Since

formal inference 1s concerned with abstractions rather than with things, it
can deal w1 th things only partially and indirectly. and thus abstract

arguments can reach only the probaLle in concrete matters.:=?4
Newman states that the terms used in tormal inference are not really
universals, but are only "generals .tt 25 Sinoe formal inference iB carried on
by means of the so-called universals whioh are

reall~

generals, all conolu-

sions of tormal inference wUl be true in general about the ooncrc'ie. but
not universally and necessarily.

Such oonclusjons can give a degree of

probability about the concrete and individual, but not certitude.

Newman

illustrates hie dootrine on univereale with the following example: "All

men

haw their price; Fabricius is a man; he has hie price; but he had not his
price; how is this?

Because he is more than a universal.,,26

In this

example the term "all men ll is not a genuine universal, nor does "having a

price lt pertain to the very nature ot man.

Such a general statement ae the

major premiss of this .yllogism could lead at beet toa probable conclUSion,
and not to a neoessary conclUSion.

The concrete tact that someone actually

will haye their price is not included within any universal 1n such a way
that the fact can be deduced from the universal.
Another example concerns the application ot general attributes of -man
as such, the ty~ical man, the auto-anthropos_2 7 to individual men:

24

-

25

Of.

26

.!ill-

27

Ibid.

Ibid., 211; ct. 204.
~.,

212.

18.
But foe t:link 1,18 r:;e.y go on to impose our d3.t'i d ti on on the 1;lhole
race, e.nd to every member of lt • • • • No; each of them is what
h. 1s in spite of it. Not anyone ot them is man, aG such, or
coincides with the auto-anthropos.
Another John is not necessarily
rational, because ~all men are rational,» tor he may be an ldlot;-nor because rtman 1s a being of progress, ,. doee the second Richard
progre8~, faD he may be a dunce; -- nor, because "man is made for
Society,q must we therefore go on to deny that the aecond Robert
b a gipsy or a bandit, as he is f'o'.md to be .28

This

eXIMaplo is

mor.a dit"f1cult. to analyze.

The :first factor to be noted is

that the conclusion \lIith which Newman is concerned is about a concrete fact,
aa is indicated by the fact that the conclusions obtained trom the qualities
of the 8uto-anthr0po8 are oontradioted by the concrate tacts about the man
who 1a an idiot or dunce or gipsy_
and

~

!.2!:

The terms rational, being

~

progress,

BOCietl could in themselves be taken a8 reterring to a radical

capacity and exigency in man tor thinking, progressing, and living 80clally.
~uoh

a meaning however oannot be the one intended by Newman 1n this example.

His example refera obviously to concrete tacts.

will not determine concrete tacts.

Attributes of man as such

It SOltleOne pretends to have dhcovered

an attribute of man ae such wh1ch will enable one to determine a concrete
fact about an individual, this attribute will be tound to be something that

is generally true about individuals, but not universally true.
Newman's next

.x~ple

on universals 18 this:

All men diej theretore ~11ee has died; « • • but he has not died,
8.M did not die. He was an exc<lptlon to the general law of humanity;
eo tar, he dld not come under that law, but under the law (eo to 8ay)
of Eliae. It • • • 113ut all men are mortal? 'I not 80; what is really
meant bythh un1verea1,1e that "man, as 8uch, is mortal," that 18,

28

.ill!.,

213

•

19.

the abstract, typical auto-anthropos; to this major premiss, the
minor, of Elias is to be proved mortal, ought to be, ",~lias wae 2
the abstraot man;~ but he was not, and could not be such, • • • • 9
If mortal in this example referred to a radical eXigency in man for death,
mortal 110uld be a universal in the true aenae.

However, as always, Newman

is conoerned here with c'ncrete tacts in the conclusion.
'l

-ill

The statement,

.!!!! .!!!. mortal, is taken by Newman to mean that every man does !!! .!!.2!

die; auch a statement would be general rather than universal.
Th~

inability ot formal inference to reach the conorete and individual

has been treated in some detail here in order to clarity two pointe. (1) The
more important point is th.t Newman i8 concerned with the attainment ot concrete ,ofacte in oonolusions. (2) A more subtle pOint i_ that so-oalled
universals which are used to determine concrete fact_ are really only generalizationsof tacts.

Such general term. cannot accomplish the determination

ot concrete facts.
The inability of formal inference to reach the concrete is a .erioue
weakness.

Even if a solution to the problem of the lnability ot logic to

prove its assumptions were found, logic or furmal inference would still be
~nable

to determine ooncrete facts.

This inability of formal inference i.e

especially important for Newman in the Grammar

~

Assent becau.e his purpose

is to diecuss how man oan reason to the divine origin of Christianity, which
is a question of concrete fact.

29 !lli.
}O

In Ii footnote in a later part of the Grammar 2!. Assent, Newman
says that what he has called the "concrete" is what Aristotle in
his Nieomaohean Ethics oalled the "contingent.- (GA,268. notel).

20.

(c) A further inadequacy of formal inference, according to Newman,
follows from the fact that it i9 verbal.

Since formal inference i. verbal,

it does not do justice to the mind, which i8 more vigorous than any of its
works, of which language is one.

;1

Words are inadequate carriers of thought:

"Thnught 1s too keen and manifold, its sources are too remote and hidden, its
path too personal, delicate, and circuitous, its subject matter too various
and intricate, to admit of the trammels of any language t of whatever subtlety
and of whatever campase_",2
In this chapter we have seen Newman's vieWB on the nature at formal
inference, and on the value. and inadequacies of this type of inference.

In

the remainder of the theeis we will investigate how Newman .olve. the problem
of

these inadequacies: lack of proot of assumptions, inability to reach the

concrete and individual tact, and limitation to what can be verbalized.

,1

Q!, 21;; ct. 206.

;2

Ibid., 216; ct. 201.

CHAPTSR 111

NATUHAL Il\F£RENCS
'1e will begin our study of Newman's solution of the problem of the inadequacies at formal interence in regard to concrete conclusions by studying
!hie theory at natural interence.

This type of inference 18 called natural

because it is the moat ordinary mode ot reasoning end is used by the uned~cated

and by men of genius.

This Dl.ode of interence difters from formal

~nference in that it is "not from propositions to proposition., but from

p;.hinga to things, from concrete to concrete, from whole. to whole •• n 1
~atural inference works directly on concrete and whole realitie. without the
~edlation

of propositions.

The outstanding characteristic of natural inference i8 ita simplieity.
~atural inference, which i. our usual type of reasoning, ia a simple act, not

~ process or series of act ••2 "We apprehend the antecedent and then appre~end

the consequent, without explicit recognition of the medium connecting

he two, as if by a sort of direct association of the first thought with the
econd.'"

orten even the antecedent itself ie only indirectly recognized aa

he antecedent or subject for analysis; thus not only the proce •• of the inerence is ignored, but in some caeee the antecedent itself is a110 ignored.

1

!!A,

2

.!!!!., 197,

251.

, ..Illi., 187.

250.

21.

22.

ITo the mind itself the reasoning is a simple divination or prediction."
simplicity of natural inference i8 explained by Newman
It

instinctive

perception. ~t

8S

4

This

the result of an

By instinct Newman does not mean that the faculty

is the same in strength and quality in all men, but rather that the prOcess of
reasoning is unconscious and Implicit. 5

6y this reasoning instinct we are able

to reason spontaneously, without conscit'lusnese ot the reasoning, and without
6 Newman defines instinct in the Grammar
effort or intention of reasoning.

2! Assent as a "perception of tacts without aseignable media ot perceiving. 11 7
In a letter to Dr. Meynell Newman says nBy instinct I mean a realization ot a
8
particular ••• without assignable media of realization. II This instinct is
the heart ot natural inference.

By means of it one can conclude directly

about a concrete tact with no consciousnes8 of how one proceeds to the conelusion.
:Since natural inference i8 instinctive in this sense, it oannot be
analyzed so as to give a clear account of how a particular conclusion was
reached.

Natural interence is 11ke taste, skill, and invention in the .fine

arts, or discretion in conduct in that these are exerted spontaneously and

4 ll!!., 251.
5

Of •

.lli!!.,

197, 250-251.

6

Of'.

!ill..

197-198 •

7

ll!!., 254.

J

8
nThe Newman-Meynell Correspondence,n appendix of Zeno, i. ~. Newman,
240. Meynell, a "SCholastic· philosopher, checked over the Grammar ~
Assent for Newman before it was published.

are not entirely explainable. 9 Newman had long recognized man's power of
implicit or instinctive reasoning.

In an Oxford University sermon which he

preached in 1840 he 8aid! "All men have a reason, but not all men can give
a reason.

The process of reasoning is complete in itself, and independent.

The analysis is but an account of it; it does not make the conclusion

correct!~O ae compares this implicit reasoning to mountain climbing'
And thus it [reason] makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a
steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot; ascends
how he knows not himself, by personal endowment and by practice.
rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to
teach another. ll
!hue far we heve seen that natural interence deale with things directly,
and is a simple unanalyzable act with no consciousness of a proce.s within
the act.

The fact that we are not conscious of the process of this act is an

indication of the nature of natural inference; "as we cannot .ee ourselves,
so we cannot well see intellectual motives which are so intlmately ours, and
which spring up from the very conetit_tion of our minds."l2 !hese motives
are taken up into the action of the illative or ratiocinative principle of
the mind which is an intrinsic and personal power.

This illative principle

assimilates theee motives and moves toward or to the conclusion, with the
motives themselvee, however, remaining unconscious.

9

2!. 257 e.

10 Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 259.
11

.!.2!:!.,

257.

12 Q!, 255.

Thus the end result is

24.
a divination or prediction.
Newman throws more light on the nature of at leaet some ca.es of
natural inference whan he 8ays that what ie oalled reasoning is often only a
peculiar and personal mode of abstraction. l ; "It ie a power of looking at
thinge in eome particular •• pect; and of determining their internal and ex14
ternal relations thereby.d
Therefore the unconscious mechanica of natural
inferenoe may be made up at abstraction of an aspect ot a thing with the
recognition that this aspect involves a relation to some other ractor} this
relation to the other factor is the oonclusion.

By meane at this type of

natural inference "a word or an act on the part ot another 1e sometimes a
Budden revelation; light breaks 1n upon UI, and our whole judgment of a
course of events, or of an undertaking ie changed.~15 Thi. abetraction and
determining ot relatione is done libya senee proper to ourselve.," since
~omeone

else may .ee the same phenomena as we do but come to • different

conclusion because he abstracts a dirterent eet of general notions trom the
phenomena. 16

This l:oaMe proper to ourselve."

doee not reter'to a aeneitive

power a8 opposed to an intellective power, but rather it refers to the
Illative Sense which is a power of the mind.
studied in the chapter on informal inference.

-

1, Ibid., 256.

-Ibid.
-Ibid.
-

14 Ibid.
15
16

This Illative Sense will be

25.

Natural interence hae the peculiarity of being departmental: it is
attached to e definite subject-matter according to the aptitude of the individual.
No one w0uld for a moment expect that because Newton and Napoleon
both had a genius for ratioCination, that in consequence, Napoleon
could have generalized the prinCiple of gravitation. or NewtoY7have
seen how to concentrate a hundred thousand men at Austerlitz.
Different persons will be Skillful in different fields of natural interenee.
The faculty of natural interence is not one general instrument of knowledge,
but is rather fta collection of similar or analogous faculties under one

name.- l8 That there are as many distinct but similar faculties of natural
interence ae there are subject matters, is exemplified by Newman's

descr1pt-

ions ot men who excel in one field ot reasoning, but are poor reasonere 1n
other fields. l9

Furthermore, natural interence i8 not the only mental skill

that is departmental; so also 18 memoryt various people have clifferent
memories,

for poetry or dates, vocabulary of languages, face., names,

~.&.

or day-to-day occurreneee. 20
The fact that natural interence is departmental has an important conseque nee in the way in which we ehould go about acquirillg knowledge.

In be-

ginning to learn any field we must trust persons who have experience in their
field, rather than trust logical science.

11

!ill., 251.

18 Ibid.

19

ot.!.!?!2..,

20

~.

J

251-258.

258-259.

~e

must take up a subject as those

26.
viho are proficient in 11', took it up, beginning at the beginning and giving
ourselves to it, dependir.g more on praotice and experience than on reasoning;
thus, we gain that mental insight into the field which the masters of it have. 2
Newman quotes Arietotle on this matter:
\-:e are bound to gi vo heed to the undemonst.rated sayings and

opinions of the experienced and aged, not lee8 than to demonstrations;
because their having the eye ot experience, they behold the principles
of th1ngs.22
Natural inference is found in all men, especially however in the uneducated and in men of genius. 2, The reason for this fact 1. that Ule uneducated
do not know about, intellectual aids and rules such as logic, and the men of
genius care nothing about such rules and aide.

Newman also saye that lithia

divination [natural inference] comes by nature, and belongs to all of' us in
a measures, to wOI'Ilen more than to men. 1124
Newman25 g1 ves mall¥ examples of' natural inference.
of them here.

A

I will indicate some

weather-wise peasant may be unable to give reasons why he

thinks it will be a fine day tomorrow, but this fact doesn't weaken his confidence in hie prediction. His mind does not proceed step by step.

He feels

together the torce of various combined phenomena, though he is not conscious
of them.

21

22

.!..!U:!.
l2!i.; the
Of.

t

259.
reterence to Aristotle 1s given a8

-

2, Of. ibid., 198, 251.
24

!ill. ,

25

Ibid. , 252-25'.

252.

~.N1oam •• vi.11,fin.

27·
30me physicians excel in the diagnosis of oomplaints, thQugh they could
not give defenee for their diagnosis against that of another physician.
Newton perceived mathematical and phye1cal truths without giving proof:
his rule for ascertaining the imaginary roots of equations wae without proof
for a century and a half and rested on no other evidence than Newton'a lagacity.
rbes~

examples of natural inference show that it is an immediate and

spontaneous grasping of the conoludon wit.hout a con8ciol,18 grasping of its
reasons, with the result that the conclusion cannot be defended.

The con-

clusion is about a concrete fact, and the unconscious reasons for the conclusions are themselves perceptions of concrete fact; worde and propositions
are not uead in arriving at the conclusion.

'rhe only juetificat10ns

or the

conclusion are the reasoner's paat experience and the actual truth of the
conclusion.
'Je shall now see how well natural interence supplies help for inadequacies of formal inference (limitation to the verbally representable level
of thought, inability to prove its assumptions, and inability to determine
concrete contingent facts).

Natural inference has given the solution to the

problem of the limitation of formal interence to the verbally expressible
level of thought.

Natural inference is non-verbal and non-propositional; it

works from things to things and from concrete to concrete.

Natural inference

has not solved the problem of the inability of formal inference to prove its
assumptions.

The assumptione of natural inference are not only unproved,

~ley

are also unknown. Not to know one'a aesumptions is worse than to know oneta
assumptions and be unable to prove them.

However, if the person who ie

28.
using natural int'erence b familiar with the
working, it eeeme as though he
subject~atter;

l~,juld

'~ubject-watter

on _;hich he ie

make the correot assumptions in this

but even in such a case the assumptions would not be proved

nor known explicitly_
Natural inference is an answer to tho problem of formal inferenoe of
reaching concrete and contingent facts.

Newman ha.d objected that formal

inference could not determine contingent facts because it U8ed so-called
universals and abstractione which could not deterwine the concrete and contingent.

Natural infer.nc., in prooeeding from thin,. t.o things and from

concrete t.o concrete and from whol_ to wholes, u.e. no universals t.o determine i t8 conclusions.

Therefore it avoids the problem whleh tormal inference

involves of proceeding from a narrow verbalized aspect ot reality to a conoret. tact of reality_

Although natural inference dOle avoid this problem,

it still does not justify the prooese by which

it does proceed to the new

concrete fact.

Its process is impliCit, and its sole justification 118s in
26
the facts that it is a natural process and that it wOJ'ke.
\~e

s.e that althou.,:;h natural inference bringl'l r .... oning above the _rely

verbal level of thought and works directly on concrete reality and gives
concrete conclusions, it still leaves the tollowing difticult.ies in realoning: (1) Natural inference can account neither tor it. assumptions nor for
its own unc(";nscioue prooess (except by its naturalness and succeea):

the

question is therefore raised as to whether there 18 a conscious counterpart

26 Ott this thesis, 54-57, for a consideration ot Newman and nominalism,
and wh.ther he can consist.ntly speak of the nature ot anything.

of natural inferenco \'/hich cen acoount

for its aseumptions and process.

(2) Natural inference does not explain how the mind works on lonr, complicated

calles 1n which the parts of the argument and groupings of these parts mUllt at
S~me

tIme be seen separately; in suoh a case, the whole would be too large to

be taken in at first '1ith one unconscious view of it.
dO$~

(~) Natural inference

not explain how formal inferenoe is to be of use to man.

~

stated earlier in

Grammar

~

Newman haa

Assent that formal inference 1s ueetul,27

but natural inference 1s unconscious and non-verbal, and therefore cannot be
aided by formal inference.

In the next chapter we will investigate Newman'.

theory at informal inference and the Illative Sense 1n order to learn whether
this theory can giv3 a solution to the problems of reasoning raised thus far.
,

27

af.

QAt

198, 199, 217, 229.
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OEAPTER IV

INFORMAL INFERENCZ
Informal inference tor Newman is fundamentally a oWllUlation ot probabili~

ltiee whioh together enable

~

I

j conclusion.

i

;

I Analogy;
I

:·
I

1

U8

to be certain ot a concrete and individual

Newman tirst learned the importance ot probabilities trom Butler t 6

however he developed hi. doctrine of the cumulation of probabilities

tar beyond Butler's doctrine on probability.

For Butler. probabilities gave

the answers to practical questions only, tor Newman, probabilities also enable

I

I

Ius to attain answers to speculative que.tions: "Butler tends to reduce the
I~

12 act

1!

icertainty to a

practical certainty, viz. that it is eater

I conclusion were

true; I maintain that probabilities lead to a .peoulative

I

I

A!

th~

certainty. ,,2

~

I

The probabilities which are accWllUlated in informal interence are called

Iprobabilities

beoau.e!!£h~

"Cation ot the conclusion.

I

ot the., taken separately, 1. a probable indi-

Oonsidered in itaelf, each one of the probabilitie.

,is really known certainly by the realoner; ita probability lies in it' function

\ •• 1nd1••~1ng by itself. a.nolu.1on. forhapa P. Planagan .tots. \hi.

I

aoro

1 J. Butler, !!:!. AnaleR' !l! R.l~ionl :Natwal.!!!!!. Revealed, 12 ~
Oonstitutlo ~ Oourse !l! Nature, 17 •
2 From Newman's letter to Canon Valker. 1664; quoted in Boekraad,
Personal Conquest, 268. Harper pointe out that the scientific sceptic,
,Willi .. Froude, seems to have adhered more striotly than Newman to Butler's
~ictum that probability is the guide of life (Harper, Newman.!!a! Froud•• 124~125) •

",

"

clearly '''ihen he Bays that "the probahili ty attache8 not to the existence of
the evidence but to the judg1l1ent which each isolated piece of evidence will
warrant.,,3

T~jia fact is not stated explicitly by Ne\ofmen in the Grammer 2!

Assent, but it is qUite clearly implied throughout the section on informal
inference; he does state that the

ar&umen~

of informal

1r~erenc.

are, in

their letter, probabilities; 4 callir.g the argument a probablli ty indicates
that the conclusion 1s probably determined by the piece of evidence, even
though the evidence itself is certainly known.
'Cach of t.heee cumulating probabilities must be independent of one another'
If they were not independent, their cumulation would not heve ae much meaning
and strength in pointing out a conclUSion.
and correct one another. 6

These probabilities should confirm

By their mutual c')nfirmation the cumulation of

probabilities is able to converge toward one conclusion.

If the probabilities

were not independent their mutual confirmation end correction would have no
added value toward indicating a conclusion.

The converging probabilities,

however, do not actually touch the conclusion in the way that a demon.8trat1on
does.

The conclusion in concrete matter 18 roreseen or pred1cted rather than

? P. Flanagan, Newman. Faith and 1h! BelIever, Westminster, 1946, 101.
l~

2,

22,.

5 .lli.2,., 219, 242.

6

~.,

222.

actually grasped. 7 In a letter written in 1846, when a French edition of his
Oxford University Sermons and

~eeal

29 Development wae being

prepared,

Nel'lIDan said, "I use 'probable' in opposition to 'demonstrative'." e Such a
meaning for probable is not necessarily opposed to what is certain, but only
to what is demonstrated. 9 Arguments ~hich are probable in the sense that
they do not demonstrate the conclusion,can still require en aesent w1th
certitude from us.
Ne~~n

compares the way that the cumulation of probabilities in informal

inference arrives at its conclusion '-lith the way that

fl

regular polygon 1rl-

Bcribed in a circle tends to became that circle as its sides are continually
diminished. lO

As this tendency of the polygon to become the circle never gets

beyond a tendency, eo aleo the accumulated probabilities of informal inference
converge toward a conclusion, and "approach it more nearly than any assignable
difference, yet do not touch it logically, (though only not touching

i~)

on

account of the nature of its subject-matter. and the delicate and implicit
character of at least a part of. the reasonings on which it depends. !Ill

We

ehould note that the subje«t-matter of informal inference ia suoh that it
cannot be touched 10glcally in aD¥ way, either by the cumUlation of probabil-

7 !.!?!!! ., 244.
':Jard, 1lli, I, 168.
9 In this thesis I will not treat directly of certitude because it is
an assent, rather than the mere result of interence.
8

10 Q!, 244.
11 lbld.

i ties in .informal inference or by the universals of formal inference.

rhe

converging probabilities however, unlike the universals of formal inference,
can render the conclusion ilas good as proved" or they can Ilamount to a
proof": the proof is the limit of the converging probabilities, as the circle
is the limit of the approaching polygon in Newman's analogy.l2
The converging probabilities are called by Newman "subtle and circul
l4
itous,'l , "delicate and implicit,l1
"intricate" and Ilin part inviBlble."l5
Thus it is seen that the converging probabilities that u:.ake up informal inference do not have the obviousness that characterizes formal inference, but
rather partake of the implicitness of natural inference.

The reasons of in-

formal inference may often be missed by people because of their subtle
character.

but not all of the converging probabilities ere subtle; Newman

Bays that they are more or less implicit and that at least part of the reasoning is delicate and implicit,16 hinting that some parts are explicit.
The convergence of' probabilities in inforlkal inference i8 something that
is felt
~ewman

88

a whole, rather than something that can be exactly enumerated.

saye that the probabilities are too numerous and various to be convert-

.

12

~

1,

.!ill- ,

219.

14

.ill!!. ,

244.

15

.!ill. , 250.

16

Cf.

.!.2!!!.,

222, 244.

ad into syllogisms .17

These numerous probabilities work on the mind in a

body, by some sort of unwritten summing up; tr1is body of probabilities which
i e the prooJ.D i s seen on 1y as a (.) ad y. 18
>

Ana 1ogous t

0

thi a j U dgroant kloIase d on a

body of pr 001' seen only as a body is the way by which we distinguish tho old

from the young, 8r brothers from one another, without being able to give the
reasons for the distlnotlons. l9

Not only is the body of proof taken as a

whole'in informal inference, but also the conclusion is taken as a whole togather with the body of proof: "le grasp the full tale of premieeae and the

conclusion. per

~

uniu9, - - by a sort of instinctive perception ot the

legitimate conclusion in and through the premiesee."20

Again Newman comparee

this perception to the way in which an object ot sense presents itselt to our

view as one whole, and not in eeparate parte. 21
In the matter of the impl1citnesl of proof' end in the fact that tht)
proof and conclusion are taken a8 a whole, informal inference i8 not identical
to natural inference.
tl

Newman says t.hat the procesa of' informal inference is

more or leas implicit, ,.22 whereas the process of nat.ural inference is oom-

plately impl1cU..

17 .!ill-,
18

cr.

19

-

219.

~.,

Ibid.

20

!ili. ,

21

-

22

Newman indicates the great.er expl1citnese of informal

229.

lbid.
Ibid., 222.

222

inf'erenoe

compa.red to natural 1ntaT<ltnce both 111 hi::! examples of informal

&.3

l.nference 2, -;00 by hls t.heory.
i ties is

U33d

The very fact that

3

cumulo.tion of pl'obabil-

in informal inference 9uggeste tilat tho various part3 of the

proof' mul:"t be known; thene parts must be neen to e01tl.e extant individually and

explicitly in order that thay oan be known an independent and

Tho fact that informal 1nf'erencs, unlike natural inference. has

ont':! anothor.
Ui.1 0

corrob~ratlng

for the explicit processes of formal inference, aleo indicate!! the re1-

ative ex/?l1ci tneofl

",r informal inference .~ono, in comparing the

explicitnes8

of informal inference and Datural inference, atates that in the former lithe
probable propositionfJ c:mverging to one definite point, are more or laas
expUoitly prominent in the mind though not in all details, wherea!!! with the

latt~r

there 1s no explicit consoiousness of antecedents at all. n24

In a sermon given at Oxford Univerdty in 18'9, Newman saids lloA good
and a bad man 'lli11 think very ditfer<::>:nt things probable. ,,25
this

layil~

was later developed by

Ne~nan

in the Grammar

~

The idea behind
Assent, whore

Newman attaches much importance to the personal slemente in the acqui8ition

ot truth. 26 ',~e should expect. tilat pernonal clements would be important in
informal interenoe sinoe the probabilities uhich are to oonverge toward a

2,

Of.~.,

24

Seno,

25

:rlewman,

l.. 11.

22'-228, 2:50-240, 245-2~, for exampl....
Newman, 140.

O,.~ord

Sermons, 191; ct. alao 2'7.

;~6 r~.g., QA, 22" 229, 2,5, 24" 249; cf. alao Newman'. letter to
Fr. Ooleridge in 1871, in Ward, ~. II, 270.

~.

conclusion in informal inference are often subtle and partly invisible; a man
with the wrong personal dispositions may find that for him the probabilities
arc too subtle or invisible and therefore have no value in indicating the
truth of a conolusion. 27 Nel>tman saw personal faotore involved throughout the
reasoning process: in relation to first principles and the way that a ca.e is
viewed, in relation to anteoedent reasons and prejudice., 2nd in relation to
the acceptance of probabilities and their convergence.
The personal elemente that Newman mentions a8 important in concrete
reasoning pertain to the
person.

m~al,

intellectual, and experiential aspects of a

The moral character of a person influence. the way in which he .ees

first principles of truth: -perception of its r=truth'a~ first principle.
which is natural to us is enf.ebled, obstructed, perverted, by allurement.
of sense and the supremacy at self', and on the other hand, quickened by
28
aapirationa atter the Bupernatural. n
Newman'a vl*w on the relationship
between prudence and reasoning aleo indicates the prominence at peraonal
moral faot.ora in his reasoning theory.

He holds that the moral quality of

prudence is required in all non-abetraot proote. 29

The judicium prudenti.

viri Is the standard of certitude in all concrete mat.ters, not only in case.
of practice but also 1n speculative questions (in regard to truth or falSity)
ae the supplement. of logio.~ In addition to prudence, other personal moral .

27 GA.

22~.

28

.!!!!.,

29

.lli.2. ., 241.

,0

Ibid.

2~7.

prerequiai tes for infer ring; truth in concr('te matter inc lude
and an intellectual conscientiousnese)l

8

sense of duty

In special fh: Ida of inquiry, ot.i1t'lr

added moral qualities are required; NefJman says this about inquirers in
field of religion: rtTbey must be

'as

the

much in earnest about religion. aa about

their temporal affairs. capable of being convinced, on real evidence, that
there is a God who gove,ns the world, and feel themselves to be of e. moral
nature and accountable creatures.' 1I~2 Without such ,;oral prerequisites a
person is most likely to misunderstand,or to miss completely, arguments about
religious matters.
Although Ne'l'llIlan stresseJ the m.oral personal elements in concrete rea80ning, he also mentions intellectual and experiential factors in reasonings which
are personal.

In commenting on a statement by Coleridge about the relation

of God and creatures, Newman mentions theee personal elements which would
determine how much benefit one could derive from Coleridge's statement: "The
general state of our ment.al discipline and cultivation, our own experience,
our appreciation of religious ideas, the perspicaCity and steadiness of our
intellectual

vls1on."~~

In other places

Newman~peak8

of strength of mind,

power of sustained attention, and pre.entimente and opinions .e personal
factors which influence one's reasoning •

.~l

~ •• 242.

j2

.!lli.,

2J,.}; Nei'lman says his quotation is from Butler, Analogy ,278.

;;

~.,

2,2.

34

Of.

!ill ..

2~5f 240.

~8.

Newlllan finde that the r;eraonal element in informal inference is indioated
by the language used to deocrlbe concrete conolusions.

,'ia are considered to teel, rather than to see, its cogency; and we
decide, not that the conclusion must be, but that it cermot te
otherwise . , e say that we do not see our wP!y to doubt it, that 1 t
is 1n;poEllble to doubt, that we are bound to believe it, that we
should be idiots, if we did not believe. ~5

Newman states that phrases such as these are used when doubt is altogether
abs6nt 1n order to signify that we arrived at the conclusions not by a sc1entif'1c neceesity independent of OW"eehes, but by the act,ion of our minde under
a sense of duty to the oonclusions end ?,.ith intellectual coneclentioueness. 36
A man haa s dut:{ to accept some things as true; to act otherwise would be to

act as an idiot would act.
we

F~ven

though we oannot demonatrate lome conclusions,

knot'l that they cannot be otherwise.
The tact that the f.reonal element is so important in the attainment of

truth in concrete matters has important eonsequ.ncee in the ways in which such
matters are to

b~

taught or learned.

'Ne'lml1n eays that Will

should use language

lito stb)ulate, 1n those to 'Nhom we address oUT3elvfu, a mode of thinldng and
trains of thought similar to our own, leading

the~

on by their

~.n

independent

aetton, not by any syllogistic compulsion."'7 Such a method of teaching will
produce better results because it considers the manner in whl{:h the :n.ind operates, as living and per90nal, and not as a computer which can be foroed to

give specific results if it is ted specific data.

,5

!!:.!!.,

241.

,6

~.,

242.

'7

Ibid., 2,5.

The prooedure ot learning

is also Bf"f'eot.ed by the importance of the personal element in acquiring
truth.

~B

"Our

er1t6r1~n

of truth is not eo much the manipUlation ot proposition.

the intellectual and moral character of the

~erson

maintaining them. n;8

The teBcher'e personal qualities indioate how trustworthy his

It is not merely by chanoe or by man's planning that such
informal illference enet.e.

teachi~
8

may be.

process aa

Newman ftatee that informal inference 1111 the

method by hhich we reach certitude in concrete matters 'from the nature of the
cas •• and trOlll the constitution of the hUllfln n;ind.".59

Because of the nat.ure of'

the human mind it must use the method of converging probabl.li ties i t it 1& to
reason to concrete conclusions and attain certitw.1e about then:. Newman calle
it a "law of our nature,* that we accept as true

an~

Qssent absolutely to

propoelt1ona th8t are not logioally demonstrated by their premi$ees.

40

fl'undemental to the supra-logical proceases of inforlIlal and natural 1nfer-

ence 10 their principle, the Illative Sense.
Nelwl"..an says ~

"~\.(t

In a letter to Dr. Meynell,

I conoidal" Ratiocina.tion :rar highsx-, fJ.oro subtle, wider,

more cel'tfiin t.han logical interonce, fmd its pr:i.nciple of action is the
lfI 11at1 ve

Seuse, f1 which I trea.t of towards the el1d, of the volume [the Ormromar

J • lt41

of' ABsent

Although the Illative

~~en3e

1s called

iii

sens!'), it is an in-

ItO ~:ard, 1!.r.!, II, 248, from a letter ~'1f Newman's to H. ';I'ilberforcc
in 1868; Harper, Newman.!E! Froude, 202.
JH

i'/ard,

1!!!.

II, 258.

J.fO.

tellec'tual pO,i¢r; N'2'w'ltlt<n

use in good .!!!P..!!.. COIf.m.on

point~·
een.~IJ,

out that he is ul!in';:0 "sense 'I as pers-Uel to its

£

sense

.9!

be,.uty_

42

In the Grammar

..2!

Assent, Nel'lmEan calle 'the Ill.tive Sense t.he ?Srteetion or virtue of the personal aetlon of the :ratiocinative fuulty;4, it it! the power ot' judging end

concludir4!. i.n ito perfeetion. 44

Illativ~

By ecmparir.g these descriptione of the

fense 'dt.h {,hat gi.ven in the btter to Or. Meynell, we discover thst the 111ative Bense he.d

tNO

meanings for NeWlllan: t.he prin.eiple of concrete reasoning in

everyone, and t.he perfectil'm of the principh (If rea8onir;g.
Illative
eeemE~

·.n~ ••

Everyone has an

yet the Illattve Sense implies a perfection of rea$oning.

It

that theee two meanings of the Illative Senae ehO\lld be taken as two

aspects of :ran's reasoning pOlA'er: the first aspect 18 t""l11s power in

ell

much

as it CO!tE!S from th$ very IU1ture of me.n; t.he second it! thh power as it exists
in gifted or exrerhnced reasoner::'.
ntbe Sense b

fJfI'tlmlln

h,"ld~

Much of Newl'I18n'lI exposition of the 111-

through analogies beti'ieen t,he I llat.he

~ense

and parallel

the.t f1hroneeis 1ncludtHl two Q(!pe·cts per.HEll t,o the two of the

Illative Sense!

"It. [Phrcr.eCi$] cOJ)l(}e of an acquired habit,

f1riE't, origin in r'..titure itself. ard 1 t h

th~U€~h it

formerl nnd matured l::;r :Frectice end

,A'!)

experience.

-

Ibid., 262.

Il4

!~.,26S; cf'. also 260 and 214 for similar definitions.

/~5

~.,

269.

hea its
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The function of the Illative Senae is to be the ultimate test of tr.uth
and error in our inf'ereneee in concrete reasoningsj46 it is

II

a rule to itself,

and appeals to no judgment beyond its own; M4 7 it goes beyond words and 8y110giems, and is more versatile than they are.

48

Newman again ueee senses

parallel to the Illative Senee 1n order to show the reasonableness of the
supremacy of the Illative Senee in its field,

It

just as there is no sufficient

test ot poetical excellence, heroio action, or gentlemanlike conduct, other
than the particular mental senee, be it genius, taste, sense of propriety,
or the moral sense, to which these subject-matters are ee.erally Cammited,·49
30

also is the Illative Sense the test of' reasoning, in concrete matter.

Phroneeis eBpecially is stressed by Newman as a power of the mind similar to
the Illative ,?ense in its ability to go beyond rules and deel with the concrete. 5O Only by our own phrones!s can we decide our own personal needs and
our own golden mean; ethical rules are not 1n themselves enough for the particular case, and can be applied to the particular caee only by the living
action ot the intellect.

Likewise, in the field ot reasoning on concrete

matter, the rules at logic are inadequate by themselvesj we are obliged to use
the Illative Sense 1n reasoning on concrete matter, and thereby we are applying the living aotion of the intellect as the final norm of reasoning.

46 !ill. , 27".
47 !lli. , 274.

48 !E.!:A. , 228, 27'.
49 Ibid. , 27'.
50 !ill- , 268-271.
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Another similarity of the Illative ;Janse and l:1lronesis 18 found in the
fact that both are departmental:

1.~.,

both phroDeai8 and the Illatiye Sense

tend to be attached to particular subject-matters,

rather than to be of equal

power in all subject-matters. 51
Properly speaking, there are as man, kinds of phrone.is as there are
Yirtues; for the judgment, good sense, or tact which is conspicuous
in a manls conduct in one subject-matter, is not necessarily traceable in another.
• •• he may be just and cruel. braye and sensual,
imprudent and patient. 52
I n a a1milarmanner. taste and ski 11 are used in reference to painting,
architecture, music, or gymnastic exercises, even though no one taste or skill
is applicable to all of these; rather, there i.s a taste or sk.ill united indis-

solubly to the SUbject-matter of each f1eld.5~

In the same manner, the

Illative ':)enee may be possessed by a peraon in one department of thought, for
instance, history, and not in another, tor instance, philosophy. 54

In 1871

in the preface to the third ed1 tion of hh Oxford UniYersi ty Sermons, Newman
gaye reasons for the departmentality of reasoning.
Thl8 inequality of the faculty in one and the same individual,
with respeot to difterent subject-matters, ariees trom two oauses,
fram want ot experience and familiarity in the details of a given
subject~tter; and tram ignorance of the principles or axioms,
ofterl recondite, v,?hich belong to it. 55

51
1e have already seen that natural inferenee, which is oarried on
the Illative Sense, is departmental. Newman had long reoognized that
rea90nil~ i8 departmental, and had mentioned this fact in a sermon in 1840.
(Newman, Oxford Sermons, 259-260).

by

52

.!!A,

271.

5~

Ct.

~.,

54

-Newman, Oxford Sermons, xiii-xiv.

55

I bid. t 272.

271-272.

4:;.
Besides the relatione of' similarity between the Illative 3ense and
phronesis, Newman aleo held some type of' real connection between theee two
powers .1e ha ve already seen that prudence is a part of' any non-abstract
proof' and is the standard of' certitude in concrete matter. 56

In a letter

to II .,;ilberf'orce in the summer of 1868, Newman is more explicit about the
oonneotion of phronesis with reasoning and certitude:
1 think it is phroneais which tells when to discard the logical

imperfection and to assent to the conclusion which ought to be
drawn in order to demonstration but is not guite. No syllogism
can prove to me that Nature is uniform -- but the argument 1s 80
strong, though not demonstrative, that 1 should not be Phronimoe
but a fool, to doubt. 51
This letter shows the identif'ication of a function of phroneeis with a
function of the Illative Sense;58

this function i8 to judge when a con-

elusion that is not demonstrated should receive an assent.
We now coree

t~

the question of' the range of' the Illative Sense.

Newman

says that this power attends the whole course of concrete reasoning, from
antecedents to consequents, at the start, couree, and conclusion of the
inquiry.59

In its application to a specific case the Illative Sense at the

beginning acts on the statement of the case.

"Thi8 depends on the particular

aspect under which we view a subject, that ia, on the abstraction which forme

56 QA, 24157 Ward • .ill!, 248-249. 'liard pointe out that this letter was written
at the time that Newman had nearly finished the first draft of the Grammar
..2! Assent.
58 The Illative Senee hae other functions beSides this one, a8 will
be seen in the following consideration of its range.
59 QA, 214, 215.

44.
our representative notion of what it is. n60 In other words, the statement of
the case i8 the peculiar and personal way in which our Illative Sense views
the concrete matter

w~ich

is to be investigated.

Thus in regard to the invest-

igation of the physical world, the case could be stated as concerning a series
of final causes or a series of initial (efficient) causes. 6l 30metimes a oase
may be stated in a simpler and more intelligible manner than it had been previ ously, because of the discovery of a new aspect of the case.
a new aspect may be discovered to be unreal.

However, such

62 Newman exemplifies the different

ways in which 4ifferent people view things by reference to how differently
people will interpret lines, colors, lettere of the alphabet, or family likeneeses:

~.&.,

the same curved line will be taken by some people as concave

and by othere ae convex. 6, In intellectual questions about concrete matters,
p",rsonal factors are even more likely to influence our statement of' the case
to be investigated.

It is the Illative Sense which does this work of stating

the case.
Further, the IllativeSenee is responsible for the "implicit assumption
of definite propositions in the first start of a course of reasoning, and the
64
arbitrary exclusion of others. 1I
As always, this work of the Illative Sense

60 ..!.lli., 282 •
61

Of.

lli.!!.

62

Of.

!ill.,

28~.

6) lill,. , 28" 284.
64

I bid. , 285.

is personal.

The action of the Illative Sense on first principles is extreme-

ly important. Newman says that assumptions, principles, tastes and opinions,
all of which are of a personal character, are half the battle in inference. 65
To assume that we have no right to make any assumptions and that we must begin
with a universal doubt, is the greatest of assumptions; and to forbid assumptions universally is to forbid this one also. 66 Even our nature and our method
of reasoning are assumptions;67 it is up to the personal action of the Illative
3ense to decide what assumptions are the correct ones to be made at the start
of any course of reasoning in concrete matter.
Yet another function of the Illative Sense is to act on the arguments
by which the question is to be answered and on the determination of the
conclusion.

Some of the arguments advanced as part of the solution of the

case are what Newman calls antecedent reasons.

Antecedent reasons are prob-

abilities or arguments which we bring with us to an investigation even before
we start

inves~igating.

They amount to prejudgments about the facts of the

Oase, are in great measure made by ourselves, and belong to our personal
character.

68 Such antecedent reasons can be good or bad depending on the

nature of the case and on our character.
ing is safe when it is negative;

65

.!..Ell., 274.

66 .!..Ell., 286 •
67

.!..Ell.

68

~.,

289.

~.&.,

Newman says that anteoedent reaeon-

the notorious bravery of Alexander the

46.
Great is an antecedent reason

\~hich

would justify us in rejecting any charge

of cowardice against him. 69 However, our knowledge of his bravery does not
enable us to perform an act of positive antecedent reasoning in order to conclude that on a particular occasion he placed a particular act ot bravery.IO
It is the function of the Illative Sanee to judge on the value of antecedent
reasons; this function, like any other function of the Illative Sense, is
exercised in a personal manner according to the individual Illative Sense.
Finally, the Illative Sense is the principle of the judging and accumulating of probabilities or arguments, and of discerning the convergence of the
probabilities toward a conclusion. Newman refers to this method ot procedure
of the Illative Senee in coming to a conclusion as "the elementary principle
of that mathematical calculus of modern times. n71
The Illative Sense operates throughout the entire course of reasoning on
concrete matter, from beginning to end.

Since all of this work of the Illative

Sense i8 done in a personal manner, it does not provide a common measure between minds;72 a strictly personal action cannot be communicated in exact
common measure to another person in the manner that abstractions can be
communicated.

It the Illative Sense is to be the ultimate test of the validity of

69

Ibid.

70 Of. ll!.2..
71

Ibid., 273.

72

Of.

ll!.2.., 275.

inference· in concrete matter, its credentials for such a position must be
examined.

Newman's starting point in showing the validity of the Illative

Sense is that we must accept the facts ot nature.
If I may not assume that I eXist, and in a particular way, that i8,
with a particular mental constitution, I have nothing to speculate
about, and had better let speculation alone. Such a8 I am, it 1s
my all; this is my essential stand-point, and must be taken for
granted; otherwise, thought is but an idle amusement, not worth
the trouble • • • • I cannot think, reflect, or judge about rey
being, without st9rting from the very point which I aim at concluding. It is enough for the proof of the value and authority of any
function which I possess, to be able to pronounce that it is natural. 7;
Newman74 continues his argwnent for the Illative Sense by saying that what is
natural to a being cannot be considered as a fault of that being.

The prin-

ciple of vitalityof' every being keeps the being as one whole with no warring
parts.

Since other beings find their good in the use of their particular

ratures, there is reason for anticipating that to use duly our own nature
~s

our interest as well as our necessity.

~e

i8 • being of progrea8, this progress is had by his personal effort in the

~Be

of his faculties.

~elt-made.

,r

I"eculiar to man is the fact that

The law of man's being is that he be emphatically

This law of progress is carried out by means of the acquisition

knowledge, of which inference and assent are the immediate instruments.

Ie appeal to man as a fact to find out the law ot his mind in regard to the
~aculty

of inference.

Pacta make us confess that there is no ultimata test

t truth besides the testimony borne to truth by the mind itself, in regard

o concrete conclusions.

This situation is inevitable for man.

7~

~.J 26~, 264.

74

This argument is from

~.,

264-267.

His progres8

48.
is a living growth, not a mechanical movement, and the instruments of his
growth are mental aots and not formulae

or

language. All that we can do is

to take man and hie powers as we find them.

Since we know that all creation

is the expression of God's will, we may substitute for a resignation to man's
destiny and nature, a cheerful concurrence in an overruling Providence, and
securely take our faculties as we find them.

The theory of the Illative

~ense

fits in with man's powers as we find them and with his growth theough mental
aots rather than by formulae of language.
Newman explicitly rejeots the position that man has faith in his reasoning power

(!.~.,

Newman holds that man knows the validity of his reasoning

power; its validity is not something in which man has a weakly-baaed trust.):
t1but of all these improprieties, none is so great as to say I have faith in
consciousness, and in reason or reasoning, for reasoning is the very breath of
my existence, for by it I know that I exist. n75
The end result which man achieves after the work of the Illative 30nse in
informal inference may be oalled moral certitude.

76 Certitude is an assent,

rather than an inference; but if the person by nis Illative Sense sees that
the probabilities

80

indicate the conclusion that he would be a fool not to

assent to the conclusion, he will normally assent to the conclusion and have

75 This is from an unpublished manuscript of Newman's (It;S -A.46.,) which
wae written in 1859. It has recently been published in Boekraad and 'rristram,
~ Argument from Consciene~ 12 ~ Exietence of Q..Qg, according 12 i. II. Newman,
Louvain, 1961, 106, and also in J. Colline, Philosophical i{eadinge !!! Cardinal
Newman, Chicago, 1961, 194.
76. .QA, 242. On the same page Newman says that he generally avoids
using the word moral in relation to oertitude and evidence because it has a
vague meaning.

49.
moral certitude about it.

Newman eays that moral certitude is all that we can

attain not only in ethical and spiritual matters but also in terrestrial and
cosmical queetions. 77

Informal inference givee a moral demonstration which

leade toward moral certitude.

Newman made the following analogy in order to

clarity the nature ot moral demonstration:
An iron rod represents mathematical or .trict demonstration; a
cable represents moral demonstration, which is an assemblage of
probabilities, .eparately insufficient for certainty, but, when
put together, irrefragable. A man who said "I cannot trU8t a
cable, 1 must have an iron bar~ would in certain given ca•• s,
be irrational and unreasonable: -- eo too is a man who says I
must have a rigid gemonstration, not a moral demonstration, of
religioue truth. 7
We have coneidered the nature of informal inference and it. principle,
the Illative Sense, in this chapter.

We have .een that informal interence ie

a cumulation of independent probabilities in concrete matter which converge
toward a conclUSion; thie cumUlation i8 carried on by the Illative Jenee, and
the entire process of reasoning is influenced by personal elements.

It now

remains for us to learn the relation of the process of informal inference
to formal and natural inference.
First we shall consider the relation ot informal inference to formal inference.

Newman eays that informal interence Ildees not supersede the logical

form of inference, but ie one and the 8ame with it; only it 18 no longer an

77 .!..E.!!. ;ia should keep in mind that Newman is speaking about questions
regarding concrete matters in these fields.

.ill.!,

78 Letter of Newman'" to Canon \4alker, July 6, 1864. quoted in 'hard,
II,

4,.

50.

abstraction, but carried out into the realities of life. H79

He also says

that informal inference, ·'acting through them~.!.., formal processes of inferenceJreaohes to conclusions beyond and above them. nBO

Informal inference
81
works "not indeed to the exclusion, but as the supplement of logic."
These
statements indicate that informal inference ie not completely separated from
formal inference, but rather works both through and beyond it. \'ihereas formal
inference cannot reach the concrete at all, informal inference, working

through formal inference, can go beyond formal inference and indicate concrete
faote in its conolusions so that we can aesent with certitude to the conclusions.

Formal inference aids informal inference by keeping the mind from

running wild,82 and by providing the many other aids which were mentioned in
the chapter on formal inference.83 Newman is not speaking exactly when he says
that informal inference is the "supplement of logic. ,,84 It is rather formal
inferenoe which is a supplement to informal; Newman states that the relation
of formal inference to informal 1s analogous to the relation of a sketch to a
portrait. 85

As a sketch shows the rough outlines of a portrait in order that

79

QA, 222.

80

ll!2.. , 240.

81

~.,

241.

82

~.,

200.

83

Of. this thesis, 13-14.

84

~,

85

Ibid., 241.

219.

51.
a well ordered portrait might be obtained, so formal inference shows the
rough outlines of thought and reaeoning, in order that we might have a well
ordered :ceaeoning process.

Formal inference is usetul, butllonly in subord-

ination to a higher logic," 86 i.e., in concrete reasoning, formal inference
is usetul only in subordination to intormal inference.
The relation ot informal inference and natural inference is not treated
explicitly by Newman.

That there is a cloae connection between these two

types of inference is shown by the similarities of the two: both are the work

ot the Illative Sense and departmental; both are personal, depending upon the
moral character and intellectual skill and experience of the individual; both
deal with concrete evidence and arrive at concrete conclusions.

Informal

inferenoe also partakes ot the implicitness of natural inference to a certain
extent; some of the probabilities may be grasped in an implicit manner, and
the summing up ot the converging probabilities into the conclusion is an
unwritten summing up, in which the premisses and conolusion are seen as a
whole.
Despite theee similarities, informal and natural inference are distinct.
The main ditference between the two is the tact that the process itself ot
natural interence is entirely unconscious;

the man using natural inference

cannot say how he arrived at his conolusion. Informal inference on the

86
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contrary is not
ated.

BO

unconsoious: the converging probabilities can be enumer-

Informal interence's explicitness is also shown by the fact that it

has use for formal inference, whereas natural inference is eo implicit
that it has no use at all for formal inference.

CHAPTER V.
SUMY~RY

AND EVALUATION.

Newman's purpose in his theory of reasoning in the Grammar

~

Assent

wae to discuss the process by which we arrive at concrete and individual
conclusions. In his effort to find the reasoning process which would enable us to know the concrete and individual, Newman first considers formal
inference. Formal inference is reasoning as it is marked out by words,
propositions and syllogisms. The scientific form of formal inference is
logic. Although Newman admits many uses of formal inference, he maintains
that it has serious inadequacies, eSp'cially in regard to concrete matter.
Formal inference must aesume some premisses; it is unable to prove all its
premieses.

Formal inference is unable to reach the concrete and individual

in its conclusions because it is carried on by means of abstractions.

Formal

inference is unable to do full justice in expressing thought since formal interence is verbal, and thought exceeds the merely verbal.
Natural inference, according to Newman, ie the apprehension of a conclusion without consciousness of the process, and sometimes even of the antecedents, which lead to the conclusion. Natural inference proceeds from the concrete to the concrete; it does not use words. Informal inference is the
cumulation of probabilities which converge toward a concrete conclusion. The
conclusion is the limit toward which these probabilities tend; they do not
actually touch the conclusion logically, but they show that the conclusion is
~,.
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inevitable.

Some conclusions of informal inference can be attained only if

certain personal elements (concerning moral character, and skill and experience in the subject-matter) are present in the reasoner. Informal inference
has somewhat of a resemblance to natural inference in that some of its
premisses may be implicit and its antecedents and conclusion may be grasped
as a whole, and to a certain extent it is non-verbal.
The Illative Sense is the principle of the supra-logical reasoning of
both natural and informal inference.

It operates throughout the entire

course of concrete reasoning, from the statement of the case and acceptance
of first principles, to the judging of arguments and the judgment about the
conclusion.
matters.

It is the ultimate norm of truth in reasoning on concrete

Its sanction is found in the fact that man is a personal and

growing being, and the Illative Sense fits in with personal growth through
reasoning.

The Illative Sense is departmental; therefore, both natural and

informal inference tend to be attached to particular subject-matters according to the individual's aptitudes.

Since the process of natural inference

is completely unconscious, it has no use for formal inference.

Informal

inference however is able to use formal inference, and works through and
beyond it.
The first task of this evaluation of Newman's reasoning theory is to
locate this theory in regard to its own position as a body of knowledge within the field of philosophy.

There is some difficulty in classifying Newman's

reasoning theory within anyone of the traditional divisions of philosophy.
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As reasoning theory, one would expect that it would tall within logic; if
logic is the science that studies mental operations in order that they may
be directed toward truth, any theory that purports to aid reasoning in attaining truth is a part of logic.

1

Therefore, there is good reason for eonsider-

ing Newman's reasoning theory to pertain to logic since it does study mental
operations in order that they may be directed toward truth.

However, Newman

himself took logic to be the scientific form of what he called formal inference, and he conSidered his theory of natural and informal inference to be
above the logical.

What Newman called logic was really the tormal logic of

reasoning; this is concerned with the formal structures of reasoning as they
are manifested by language structures.

Material logic, which might prevent

formal logic from becoming overly abstracted from reality, was neglected in
2
Newman's age.
Because of this neglect, logic became practically synonomous
with formal logic; even in our day, logic is often considered only in its
formal aspect; espeCially in symbolic logic.
reasoning contains

80

Since Newman's theory of

much beyond the formal aspects of reasoning, in regard

to both the objeots on whioh we reason and the subject who reasone, it might
be misleading to classify his theory as logic.

Nevertheless there is some

1 We are here prescinding from the question of the validity or nonvalidity of such a theory; true logic and false logic both pertain to the
field of logic.
2

"Indeed, for some three hundred years, no less, prior to the advent

ot this newer logic, the schools of Europe had apparently committed themselves to presenting an empty husk of logic, which they called Aristotelian, •
• • • " (Henry 5. Veatch, Intentional LogiC, New Haven, 1952, 'jcf. also
,96, note 2, on the negleot ot material logic).
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reason for calling it logic, since it does give a method and other advice (e.g.
the method of

convergir~

probabilities, the recommendations to consider person-

81 factors required for various reasoning processes, and the need for familiarity with the subject-matter) in order that the mind may be directed to truth.
Newman himself speake of a "higher logio n above verbal argumentation.~
Another possible classification for Newman's reasoning theory is epistemology.

Dessain,4 however, holds that Newman is not dealing with epistemology

in the Grammar

~

Assent.

Although Newman's main purpose in the Grammar

~

Assent was not epistemological, he does treat an epistemological problem in a
brief way.

Newman does decide that his theory of the Illative Sense is valid

because it explains the living growth of man through knowing and reasoning.
He also judges from the nature of concrete matter and from the nature of the
human mind, that certitude may arise from arguments that are in their letter
probabilities.
ternal reality.

Therefore, Newman does hold that man oan know concrete exNewman, however, does not have an epistemology in the usual

sense of the word.

He does not argue to a theory of what the mind knows, as

does Kant in his Critique
~.

£!

~

Reason, or Hegel in his Phenomenology of

He rather takes for granted that the mind does know reality in the

moderate realist sense of reality.

Any development of epistemology would

seem to be impossible for Newman since he held that in any criticism of our

4. o. S. Dessain, IIOardinal Newman on the Theory and Practice of
knowledge,1I Downside Review, 75 (1957), 7.
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minds we must start at the very point at which we hope to end.

His episte-

mology amounts to a practical attitude: use your human nature as you find it;
accept natural and informal inference because they are descriptive of the
living, personal growth of a human nature in knowledge.
Most of Newman's theory of reasoning pertains to the field of rational
psychology or philosophy of man.

Newman's psychology is greatly to be pre-

ferred to much modern psychology which evolves its theories within analogical
models of man, thereby saying nothing directly of man;

Newman's theory, on

the contrary, is a desoriptive theory of man's reasoning; he described the
observable facts of man's reasoning processes in concrete matter, and then
he points out the essential factors within these processes, and then he adds
his hypothesis of the

Illa~ive

Sense to explain these facts.

Instead of

attempting to isolate his reasoning theory from the philosophy of the human
person, as is done in logic, Newman tries to include his reasoning theory
~ithin

the philosophical position that man is a self-making personal unity

that grows through acquiring knowledge.
Newman's theory of reasoning shows many insights into the nature of man's
reasoning and the nature of man himself.

Hie doctrine of the wholeness or

simplicity of natural inference indicates an important insight into the operation of the human mind. The most valuable of Newman's inSights into the
nature of reasoning and of man concern the personal and non-verbal aspects
of reasoning.

His doctrine that moral character and skill and experience

affect reasoning ability, and that what 18 a proof to one person will be
nadequate for another, shows the unity of the human person and the mutual

~.

interaction of the various parts of the person.

His theory that concrete

reaeoning goes beyond the merely verbal level of thought indicates more about
the nature of man's mind.

His realization that reasoning to concrete conclu-

sions requires a different method from that of reasoning to non-concrete conclusions, and his theory of informal inference are also important for an
understanding of how man's mind operates.
a contribution to psychology.

The Illative Sense also represents

And all of Newman's reasoning theory fits in

with his doctrine that man is selt-creating and grows through acquiring knowledge in a living way.
Although Newman does present a "higher logic" with methods and advice for
correct reasoning, his reasoning theory should be considered primarily ae a
contribution to the philosophy of man: his insights are primarily into the
nature of manls mental operations and secondarily into the means for correctly
guiding these operations.
Since Newmanls theory of reasoning is primarily part of a philosophy of
man that is based on observation, it is fitting that our primary evaluation
of it be based on a consideration of how accurately Newman does describe the
reality of reasoning.

First we shall consider natural inference. Our decision

about the accuracy of Newman's description of the reality of reasoning will
depend upon the answers to these questions:

Does reasoning sometimes occur

as the apparently immediate grasping of a conclusion, without awareness of
the antecedents?

Can we reason directly from unconscious concrete antecedents

to a concrete conclUSion, without using words as mediums of our reasoning?

One example that Newman gives of natW"al inference concel'll. physicians
who excEl 1 in the diagnosis of complaints.

.'e should study this example in

order to learn whether it ahaws (a) an immediate grasp of a conclusion while
the process leading to the conclusion,and maybe even the antecedent.,are
unconscious; (b) reaBoning trom concrete to concrete, without words aa a
mediUIII.
Newman saya that some physicians excel in the diagnosis ot complainte
even though they may be unable to detend their diagnoaie against that ot
another physician.

In such a ca8e the physician would perceive (we should

not restrict "perceive" to the merely sensible level, but rather include a180
intellectual perception) the over-all physical state of the person.

He would

proceed trom thi8 perception to his diagnosie, which 18 hi_ conclusion.
he c!nnot detend his diagnosis against other physicians.

let

This tact indicatea

that he was unconacious ot the prooess by which he arrived at hi. conclusion;
had he known the proceas, it would serve ae his detenee.
that he proceeded trom concrete to concrete.

.Aho it appear I

He perceived the concrete tact

ot the person's physical condition and then judged what was wrong with the
person, another concrete tact.

It eeems obvious that there were no worde

involved a8 media ot arriving at the conclusion; it worda were media in hia
procesl ot reasoning, he could use these words to detend his conclusion
against other physicians.
Another of Newmanls examples ot natW"al inference concerns Napoleon's
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conclusions in military matters, which appeared as immediate judgments. 5

If

the enemy's troops were scattered, Napoleon knew at once how long it would
take them to concentrate and how many hours must elapse before they could
attack.

In other words, Napoleon perceived the scattered .tate of the enemy

(this perception is the concrete and non-verbal antecedent), and judged spontaneouely a. to how long it would take them to concentrate for attack.

This

judgment was based on hie peroeption of the scattered state of the enemy.

He

wa. not aware of an, reasoning process leading from his perception of the
scattered state of the enemy to his judgment of how long it would take them to
concentrate, because this judgment immedi!tely followed hi_ perception.

Per-

haps he wa. eyen unconscious of the fact that hi. judgment about the time
needed for the concentration of the enemy was based on hi_ perception of
their scattered state.
probable.

Thi. latter unconsoiousnes8 however seems very im-

At any rate it is not absolutely :neceesary for natural inference.

The essential element or natural interence is that the procese from antecedent
to conclusion be unconscious, and in this example it appears such; it aleo
appears that the reasoning doee proceed from concrete to concrete, from the
scattered condItion of the enemy to the length of time required for them to
concentrate.

There is no yerbal medium; Napoleon could proceed immediately

trom the perceptIon or the concrete IItuation to a judgment on the concrete
tact or how long concentration will take.
Newman's doctrine of natural inference not only agre.s with tacte but allo
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represents a good insight into facts.

kany examples of this 8pontaneous

reasoning can be found in everybody's life;

~.&

.•

we directly conolude that

a person i8 not reeling well from our percept10n of hie appearance, or we
judge that a person i8 angry at ue from our perception or hie appearance.
~ven

though Newman has described in natural inference a phenomenon of which

!h! way

we should be aware, such e form of interence gives little insight into

£1 which we reach concrete conclusions. Newman's theory ot natural inference
merely tells us that we reach concrete conclusione and that we do ao by an
unconscious and non-verbal power of our mind; it providea no explanation of
these facte.

Nevertheless it doe. represent an accurate descript10n of the

reality of reasoning.
Next, we must evaluate informal inference in regard to its acouracy a. a
description of the reality of rea.oning.

The question which we must answer

here 1s this: can and do men arrive sometimes at concrete conclusions by means
of non-demonstrative arguments (1.e.,

II

probabil1tiee") which converge toward a

conclusion and indicate that the conclusion must be true?
The concrete conclusion "Great Britain is an reland," ie given by Newman
as an example of a conclusion that we hold by an informal inference,

6

Men

hold this conclusion even though we do not have the highe8t kind of proof
possible, "Those who have oiroumnavigated the Island have a right to

b~

tain: have we ever ourselves even fallen in with anyone who has'l"7

Here are

oer-

the reasons Newman gives for the average man'. belief that Great Britain is

6

.ll!1.,

22,-225.

7 llli., 224.
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an island:
We have been so taught in our childhood, and it is so in all the
maps; next, we have never heard it contradicted or questioned; on
the contrary, everyone whom we have heard speak on the subject of
Great Britain, every book we nave read, invariably took it for
granted; our whole national history, the routine transactions and
current events of the country, our social and cammercial system,
our political relations with foreigners, imply it in one way or
another. Numberless facts, or what we consider facts, rest on the
truth of it; no received facts rests on its being otherwise. If
there is anywhere a junction between us and the continent, where
is it? and how do we know it? is it in the north or in the south?
There is a manifest reductio ad absurdum attached to the notion
that we can be deceived on suCh a point as this. 8
No one of these arguments is a demonstration of the fact that Great
Britain is an ieland.

Yet each one of them does point toward the conclusion

that Great Britain is an island.

If we take all of them together we still

would not have a logical den1onstration that Great Britain is an island, but
the indications of this fact converge so strongly toward this conclusion that
only a fool would not accept this conclusion.

Of course, we might object to

Newman that we hold that Great Britain is an ieland on the basis of a human
faith which we have not investigated.

This may be true for some or many in-

dividuals, but could not such a person investigate the indications of the
insularity of Great Britain and by means of an informal inference arrive at a
reasonable certitude that Great Britain is an island?

There is no apparent

reason for not accepting Newman1s theory of informal inference as descriptive
of a method by which one could arrive at a concrete concluBion, and it appears
to the author of this thesis as though this method is often used.

8

Ibid.

Ne~an

proposed hie theory of reasoning as the solution to the problem

of three inadequacies of formal inference in regard to concrete conclusions.
These inadequacies are (1) the inability to prove all of its premisses and
assumptions, (2) the inability to reach the concrete and individual, and (')
the insufficiency of verbal logic in representing the su~ety of the mind.

In

our evaluation of Newman's reasoning theory we should consider whether these
inadequacies are really present in formal inference, and whether informal inference overcomes these inadequacies.
(1) First we shall consider the inability of formal inference to prove
all of its premisses and assumptions.

This inability seems to be a necessary

factor within syllogistic reasoning such as formal

inference.

Before such

reasoning can be carried on, there must be two premisses which can be compared
in the syllogism.

If these two premisses are proved in two other syllogisms,

these other syllogisms contain a total of four premisses; somewhere there must
be a beginning to this series of syllogisms, and there, premisses will be
found, which are not proved syllogistically.

Aristotle would tend toward a-

greeing with Newman on this first inadequacy of formal inference, although it
appears that he would require a smaller number of undemonstrable principles of
reasoning:

II

For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolute

'. 1y everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be

no demonstration) .,,9

Aristotle, M.etaphyeics, -i/orke .£! Aristot.le, trans. by
9
VIII, Oxford, 1928, bk. Q, ch. 4, 1006a9.

'rl.

D.

~ioss,
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It is even more obvious that assumptions of a personal character or from local
customs or ideas of the age, are not prowed by formal inference or formal
logic; formal logic works at the comparison of premisses to learn what conclusion is justified from given premisses; it does not investigate or judge about
assumptions of the reasoner. 'rherefore, it must be admitted that

~~ewman

is

orrect in holding that formal inference is unable to prove all of its premsses and assumptions.
The problem next to be solved is whether informal inference is able to
vercome the inability of formal inference to prove its premisses and as sumpions.

Informal inference, in fact, must begin with some assumptions; acoord-

ng to Newman even our nature and our way of reasoning are assumptions.

Also,

n any partioular informal inference, there must be assumptions made as to
irst principles, and there also must be assumptions of a personal nature.
nformal inference is no more able to prove these assumptions than is formal
nference.

Newman's solution to thiB difficulty is his Illative 3enae, which

udges the validity of the assumptions to be used in informal inference. In
words, the personal aotion of one's mind, working in accord with one's
oral character and experience in the particular subject matter, judges
hether assumptions are true or false.
This solution to the inability of formal inference to prove its premisses
nvites two objections: (A)

the Illative Sense may be in error in its judgment

bout the assumptions; (J) formal inference may use the Illative Sense in the
ame manner as does informal inference, in order to judge its premisses.
irst objection must be allowed to stand as valid.

Since everyone has an

The
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Illative Senee (at least the first aspeot of the Illative Senee, even though the
seoond aspect, of skill and experience in the subjeot-matter may be missing) and
sinoe people do make errors in assumptions for concrete reasonings, we may safely conclude that the Illative Sense can err about assumptions.

Newman, himself

mentions a case in which an Illative Sense erredjn regard to assumptions. 10
Newman's position is not that every Illative Sense is infallible, but rather
that the Illative Senee, through growth in moral character, skill and experience
becomes a more and more reliable judge, and that one with "an honest purpose
11
and fair talents" will make his way to the truth.
Although the Illative
Sense neither proves assumptions nor is always infallible about them, it still
remains our only way of judging them, and an Illative Sense in its full meaning,
one which has been perfected through experience and is joined with good moral
character and natural ability, is to be fully trusted in its judgments about
assumptions and principles of reasoning.
~row

'r'ithout such a sense, how could man

in his knowledge?
The second objection, that formal inference could use the Illative Sense,

as informal inference does, to judge its premisses, oannot be allowed as valid
if one accepts Newman's view of formal inference.

Formal inferenoe, as present-

ed by Newman, is a process which is isolated from the living action of the mind.
It appears that the rationalists who would hold such a view of reasoning as
desoribed in Newman's formal inference must have objectified reasoning so much

10 QA, 289.

11 .!,2g., 287.
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that it became

strictly a syllogistic process on paper, and was cut off from

the good judgment of the mind. Such an objectified process of reasoning would
therefore be unable to receive help from the Illative Sense because the 111ative 3ense does not work syllogistically, nor can all of its work be written
down, since some of it is non-verbal.

Whether or not such a completely object-

ified view of reasoning was held, Newman is making a point against those who
stressed logical inference since this type of inference

~

itself is unable to

prove or judge its premisses; it was unwise of rationalists to misplace effort
on logical inference when the effort should be spent on an investigation of
assumptions.
(2)

The second inadequacy of formal inference according to Newman is its

inability to reach the concrete and individual.

aecause of this pOSition,

Newman has often been accused of nominalism or conceptualism. 12

The only way

to solve the problems raised by this position is to discover first of all what
concrete and individual or concrete meant to Newman.

The possible meaning of

these terms is not as unique ae might be thought at fir,et sight; in fact, there
are several types of the concrete, each of which might be called concrete.
Newman himself does not explicitly state the meaning of the concrete, except
for one footnote in which he states that what he calls the concrete, Aristotle

12 Cf. Charles F. Harrold, ~ Henry Newman,London, 1945, 40" note 5,
for references to sources accusing Newman of Nominalism. Many authors state
that Newman was not concerned with metaphysics and did not intend to enter
the famous controversy about universals (e.g., TheiS, "Einfahrung," Newman
Studien, II, 194; Zeno, ~ Heney Newman, 7'-74; Deesain, "Newman on
Knowledge," Downside Review, 75 1957), 18).
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oalled the contingent. 15

The examples which Newman uses to illustrate concrete

conclusions are most useful in enabling one to decide what concrete meant to
Newman. First of all, let us consider a division of various types of the
crete based on the relation of the concrete to a universal.
concrete things which are

determinable~merely

~

There are some

because they are contained within

the extension of a universal, e.g., John is a social being beoause be is a man
and all men are social beings.

In this example, social being, signifying that

one has a radical aptitude and tendency toward living in society, can be inferred from the faot that one is a man, because it is part of the nature of man
that it have a radical aptitude and tendency toward living in society.
Besides this one type of the concrete, which is determinable by universal,
the other types of the concrete are not determinable by universals by themselves.

These typos of the concrete include the following: (1) the fact of

existence, e.g., Great Britain exists; (2) the fact of a mode of existence in
no way contained under a universal, e.g., Great Britain is an island; (5) a
fact which appears to be contained under a universal physical law, but since
there could be exception to the physical law, is not absolutely determined by
the physical law, e.g., the sun will rise tomorrow; (4) a fact which appears
to be contained under a

universal "moral" law, but which is not absolutely

determined by the "moral" law since there can be exception to the 'Imoralll law
through man's free acts; such a fact would be, e.g., John will act socially in
this particular instance. None of these four types of the concrete can be
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determined by means of a universal; it appears that the best way in which
these types of the concrete can be designated as a group i8 to say that they
pertain to the singular as Singular.
It will be seen by an examination of the examples of what Newman called
the concrete or the concrete and individual, that none of them refer to the
concrete in the sense of a concrete radical aptitude and tendency existing in
a nature.

All of hie examples refer rather to the concrete in the latter four

senses mentioned above, i.e., the concrete which is not determinable by universals.

Therefore, in the Grammar ]! Assent, concrete refers to facts that per-

tain to the Singular

~

Singular.

We are now able to judge with facility about the second inadequacy of
formal inference, its inability to reach the concrete and individual.

Formal

inference for Newman is syllogistic inference conducted by means of universals.
Universals, however, cannot enable us to determine facte about the singular as
Singular; such facte are independent of universals.

Therefore, formal infer-

ence and its universals are unable to reach the concrete (which for Newman
signifies facts about the Singular as singular).
The charge that Newman is a

namir~list

cannot be based on the fact that

he held that universals are unable to determine facts about the Singular as
singular; moderate realists also maintain that universals cannot enable us to
determine facts about the Singular as singular.

Newman however does make

statemente in the Grammar of Assent which seems to indicate nominalism: e.g.,
"iihat is called a universal is only a general. u14

14

Ibid., 212.

This statement, however, i8

made in a context about attempts to determine the concrete and individual by
means of a universal, and its meaning could be taken to be: a universal which
is used in an attempt to determine a CQnerete conclusion, is only a general.
In other words, Newman was concerned only with the attainment of concrete conclusions; universals used to determine such conclusions cannot be
on the nature of man

ba~ed ~erely

(e.g.) eince the nature of man tells us nothing about

the singular as singular;

w~'

can however make statistical sUllllIlaries about

singulars and apply such data to other singulars; such statistical summaries
about singulars are "generals.1\
That Newman did not hold nominalism is also indicated by many statdmcnts
in the Grammar of Assent in which he speake of true universals that are not
generals.

He says that, ~Ieven one act 01" cruelty, ingratitude, generosity, or

justice, reveals to us at once intensive the immutable distinction between
those qualities and their contraries. U 15 He speaks of original forms of thinking

"connatural with our mindsil and of t,he "conditions of' hwnan naturellj he

also mentions the duty of resignation to the ulaws of my nature,n l 6 He holds
that the umind is made for truth!!, and he speaks of errorz:s which belonE; to the
individual and not to his nature. l7

All of theee 3tatementsindioate that

Newman held some Bort of true universal which has its basis in reality.

15 ll!i., 50.
16

~.,

49, 205, 264; cf. also 6.

16

~.,

167 and 6.
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Now that we have finished discussing the problem of the inadequacy of
formal inference to reach the concrete, we will consider whether informal inference does not experience the 8ame difficulty in its attempt to reach the
ooncrete.

Newman himself holds that the probabilities of informal inference

converge toward a conclusion, but they do not touoh the conclusion: as a regular polygon inscribed in a

circle tends to become that circle as its aidea

are continually diminished, so also the cumulation of probabilities approaches
the conclusion more nearly than any assignable difference, yet does not touch
it logically.

Therefore, it appears that informal inference is also unable to

reach the concrete.

However, there is a difference in the ways in which formal

and informal interence reach conclusions; formal interence, by means of general
terms, has only one indication that its concrete conclusion is true; this indication is that the concrete tact should be included within the scope of the
general term.

On the other hand, intormal inference has many converging in-

dicationa of the truth of the concrete conclusion.

The single indication of

formal inference of the truth of a concrete conclusion is not sufficient to
make us assent to it, but the many indications of informal inference may so
reinforce one another that we are able to see that the concrete conclusion
cannot be false, and we would be imprudent not to assent to it.

In this way

informal inference is able to reach the concrete; even though it does not
logically include the concrete conclusion within its premiasea, it nevertheless
indicates the conclusion so strongly that the human mind in the right condition
recognizes an obligation to assent to the conclusion.
The objection was placed againat Newman that his theory ot informal
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inference violated the fundamental rule that the conclusion cannot be stronger
than the prem1ues; 18 in informal interence the conclusion may be certain even
though the premisses are probable.

Such an objection presuppose. an unaware-

ness of the meanings of probable and certain for Newman in this context.

The

probable in regard to arguments for a conclusion is opposed not to certain but
to demonstrative; an argument which does not demonstrate a conclusion may
nevertheless indicate the conclusion with some degree at probability.

A num-

her of independent arguments or facts, each one of which, taken separately,
probably indicates a conclusion, may, taken as a whole, so indicate the conclusion that a prudent man would be certain of the conclusion.

Thie certitude

about (or certain assent to) the conclusion is a moral certitude and not an
absolute certitude.

Newman said in an unfinished letter to William Froude:

"We differ in our aense and our use of the word 'certaih'. I use it of minds,
you of propOSitions • • • I maintain that minds may in my sense be certain of
conclusions which are uncertain in yours. \1 19 The prudent man recognizes a duty
to assent to undemon8trated conclu8ions when there is sufficient evidence for
them.

Therefore, there is no conflict between probable premisses and a certain

conclusion in Newman's theory of informal inference.
(,)

The third inadequacy of formal inference according to Newman concerns

18 Leslie 3t,phen, "Oardinal Newman's SceptiCism,"

lh!

Nineteenth Century,
li!! Theory of

29 (1891), 190, referred to by John F. Oronin, Oardinal Newman:
Knowledge; Washington, D.O., 19,5, 77.
19 Ward,'y:£!, II,

~7-588.
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the relationship of formal inference, ae verbal, to thought: formal inference,
as verbal, cannot do full justice to thought.
any of itl works, of which language il one.

The mind is more vigorous than
According to Newman's desoription

of formal inference, it is undoubtedly limited to the level of thought that
can be verbalized; formal inference is oarried on by meane of universal terms
within syllogisms.

Anything non-verbal would not fit in with the highly ob-

jectified nature of formal inferenoe; the non-verbal bringe in the subjective
alp8ct of thought, which il out of place in formal
objeotively written down in its entirety.

reasoning which can be

It appears that Newman is correct

in limiting logic to the verbal level of thought.

The question remains,how-

ever, as to the ability of informal inference to go beyond the merely verbal
level of thought and to utilize the power of the mind more fully_

It il

apparent that there are non-verbal factorl in informal inference.

Non-verbal

tactorl of primary importance in the theory of informal inference are the
personal qualities of the reasoner.

The aoral character, skill and experience

of the reasoner are not verbal in nature, nor are they communicable to others
merely b, worde.

Yet these personal elements stfect the entire proces8 of in-

formal reterence; because ot such personal elements one person will choose
correct first principles,

another will choose incorrect ones; these personal

elements affect the way in which one views the case to be conSidered, and the
judging of

t~e

various probabilities that make up an informal inference: they

also affect one'. judgment .s to whether probabilities converge so etrongly
that the concrete conclusion should receive one's assent.
Another class ot non-verbal factors in informal inference are implicit

7'.
premissea.

It seems quite possible that one or two premisses of an informal

interence remain implicit in the manner of the antecedents of natural inference.
ror instance, one could reason to the probable date of origin of a piece of
MUsic on the basis of certain harmonic structures and a certain type of melody,
and also because of some other quality which one perceive. but is not able to
state; such reasoning would involve some sort of an implicit and non-verbal
premiss.

This is not to say that such implicit premi ••ee are also entirely

non-verbalizable.

The writer of this thesis cannot see how a premiss could

be entirely non-verba11zable, nor how such a premiss could ever be spoken

about if it did exist.
A third class of non-verbal factors in informal inference concerns the
matter of

h2!

the probabilities go about converging on a concrete conclusion.

A person can state all the arguments of an informal inference and also state
~

they converge toward a conclusion as a limit, but he cannot state-h2!

they do so.

Each person must look for and see how the convergence takes place

with his own mind, rather than merely receive a verbal statement of it from
another.

Words are not adequate to stating the comparison of all the arguments

as a whole with the conclusion.
This non-verbal aspect of reasoning is very important for Newman's theory
of reasoning in concrete matters.

It is precisely because of this non-verbal

element in reasoning that we are able to reach concrete and individual conclusions.

In a non-verbal way we are able to see that the sum total of the

probabilities of an informal interence so indicate a concrete conolusion that

74.
it i& inevitable.

By the mere wards of formal interence we could not determine

the concrete conclusion.

By the power of the mind in informal inference which

works through and beyond words, we can determine a concrete conclusion as the
limit of converging probabilities (non-demonstrative arguments).

A non-verbal

power of the mind enables us to eee arguments as converging upon a concrete
conclusion and as indicating that conclusion as their limit.

Of course, per-

sonal elemente (e.g., prudence, senee of duty to truth, and experience in the
subject) will affect the view which the person takes of the unwritten summing
up of all the arguments.
Throughout Newman's theory of reasoning there is an emphaeis on the importance of personal factor..

The personal action of the Illative Sense is re-

sponsible for the statement of the case, the chooeing of first principle., the
evaluation of arguments, and the judgment aa to the convergence of arguments
and whether the conclusion merits assent.

The problem raised therefore, by the

whole of Newman's reaeoning theory, 1s whether his theory ia completely subject
ive, with no regard for the objectivity of truth.

If each person ha. hia own

way of looking at a case, his own first principles, and his own outlook on the
parts of the proof and their value as a

whole, what happens to the objectivity

of the knowledge obtained by reasoning?

There can be no doubt that Newman him-

self held that man can and does obtain objective knowledge of external reaH ty.
Hie entire reasoning theory

Wal

developed to explain how we attain conclusions

about the concrete and individual.

He eays, "We reason in order to enlarge our

knowledge of matters, which do not depend on us for being what they are."20

20

Q!, 211.
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The

~uestion

still remains, however, as to whether Newman's theory of reasoning

has stressed personal elements

80

much that it no longer allows the poesibility

that knowledge be objective.
It appears that there is no opposition between Newman's etress of personal
tactors in reasoningaodthe objectivity of knowledge.

Newman's stress of the

personal should be taken as a good attempt at explaining how objective knowledge exists within the human person.

Any theory of human knowledge and reason-

ing should explain how these exist in the person; otherwise it 1s overlooking
one ot the mopt obvious tacts about knowledge and reasoning, that they are

of a

activities/person.

That personal factors ot skill and experience do in fact

influence reasoning ability must be admitted.

~verybody

showe respect for the

reasoning ability ot competent physicians, engineers, lawyers, or physicists in
their respective fieldsj such men,have a familiarity and
ject matter, which were dev.loped through experience.

rap~ort

with their sub-

The departmentality ot

reasoning ability in a person is a recognized fact, and is vell illustrated by
~ewman'8 reference to the incongruity

ot a Newton who could concentrate an army

¥or battle and a Napoleon who could generalize the principle of gravitation.
The relation of personal elements of the moral order to concrete reasoning
is a aore subtle one, but Newman's stress of the moral personal elements in
reasoning aleo is congruent with our experience.

Nobody is convinced of a

concrete conclUSion that is entirely contrary to his wishes.

Since it is the

person who perceives reality and reasons about it, the quality of that person
~hould

be expected to influence the quality of the perception and reasoning.

physiCian who has no sense of duty or intellectual conscientiousness will not

A

76.
reason a8 well as one who i8 conscientious.

An enquirer about religion who

leads a dissolute life will reason differently about it than will a person
who leads a virtuous life.
Another charge of subjectivism
against Newman i. based on hi. doctrine
21
of the Illative 3ense.
However, the fact that the Illative Sense is called
the ultimate test of truth or fal.1ty in concrete rea80nings does not signify
that Newman has abandoned the objectiv1ty of Knowledge.

He i. al.ay. clear

about the fact that the Illative Sense 1n ita developed state works upon evidence. In other worde, the Illative Sense is the ultimate subjeotive norm of
truth or falaity in concrete reasonings, but it work. upon objective evidence.
However, the ability of the Illative Sense to asaimilate the evidence will depend upon the condition of the particular Illative Sense; eome Illative Seneee
may err because they do not have the required moral, intellectual and experiential attribute. needed to succeed in a particular subject.
The Illative Sense has value a. an explanatory prinCiple of important
factors in Newman'. reasoning theory,

it indicatea that concrete reasoning is

a living activity done in a personal and partially non-verbal way.
of the Illative Sense presents

difficulties however.

The theory

One of these is the fact

of the two aspects of the Illative 3ense: (1) the concrete rea80ning principle
in everybody. and (2) the concrete reasoning principle in thoae who have developed their rea80ning skill through experience, and who have a good moral

21

cr.

Cronin, Newman,

79.

17.
charaoter.

In most of Newman's development of the theory ot the Illative

Sense, he speaks only ot the second upect rL it. However, the first. aspect of
the Illative 3enae must also be admitted since it is the principle of any concrete reasoning ( in which everyone

indulge.) and Binoe it can err.

These t.wo

aspects easily lead to contusion about Newman's theory .ince he doee not explicitly distinguish them.

The result 18 that he appear. either to have lett most

people without an ultimate subjective norm ot trut.h in mo.t tields, because
they do not have an Illative Senae (in its seoond aspect), or to have given
everybody 80me sort ot infallibility sinoe everyone has an lllat.lve Sense (in
it.s first aspect), and it is the ultimate subjective norm of truth.

Newman's

pOSition i. rather that everyone doe. hawe such a subjective norm ot truth, but
they must work to improve this norm.

The mere tact that the Illative Senee ie

the ultimate subjective norm does

require that it be intallible.

~

Another ditticulty ooncerning the Illative ienae is its ontological statu••
Although Newman speaks ot parallel taoulties to the Illative 3an•• , it ie not a
taculty in the soholastic Bense ot the term.

The Illative Sense pertorms so

many diveree operations throughout the reasoning process that it could not be
called a faoulty in the striot scholastic sense.

In its tirst aspeot, the

Illative Sense is the native ability ot the mind tor concrete reasoning.

In ita

second aspeot (the one in which Newman ordinarily uses it) it i_ the souroe ot
a faoility or .aee in concrete reasoning, and is parallel to phrone8is, sen.e ot
beauty, sense ot good taate, etc.

The Illative Sen.e amounts to an explanatory

principle by which the many points ot Newman's concrete reasoning theory can b.
explained.

Its ontological reterence pointe are the various aspects of the

78.
mindwh~

are involved in concrete reasoning.

A final question concerns the limite of the application of Newman's
reasoning theory.

Our main criterion of the limite of its use should be the

limits which he sets to it himself.

Unfortunately he does not speak explicitly

about the limits of hi. theory; this fact

~ight

lead one to gather as a first

impression that there are no limits to the applicability it hi. theory and that
Newman intends hie theory to be the complete theory of reasoning.
pression however would be erroneous.

Such an im-

Throughout hie development of his own

reasoning theory in the Grammar £! Assent, Newman states explicitly and shows
by his examples that he is concerned with deonerete reaenning", i.e., reasoning which concludes in the knowledge of a concrete and individual tact.

Since

this is hie express purpose, and since he states nothing about the completeness
of his reasoning theory, it is reasonable to accept Newman's theory as applicable only in concrete reasoning.

That Newman did not consider his reasoning

theory in the Grammar to be complete is also indicated by hi. reference to the
Grammar as a "conversational essay" and a dpreliminary opening ot the ground. d22
The limitation of the purpose of Newman's reasoning theory aleo offers an explanation for hie devaluating of formal inference and his stres. upon informal
inference.

3ince formal inference cannot aocount for our certitude about con-

crete and individual conclusione,whereas informal can, it ie entirely consistent with Nswman'e purpose that he show how formal inference is inadequate in
regard to the concrete and individual, and not develop the value of formal inference in science and philosophy.

22

Letter to Father Nsltord, in Ward,

~,

II, 266.
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Newman has given important insights into the nature of reasoning on
concrete matter.

He has shown the inability of logic in questions about

the singular as singular, and has offered a method by which such conclusions
can be reached; in this method is included an important inaight, that the
convergence of arguments toward a concrete conolusion, so as to irdicate that
the conolusion must be true, can be judged by the mind even though a verbal
demonstration of the conclusion cannot be given; the mind is ~ore vigorous
than anyone of its work"such as language.

Newman has described

factI about

implicitness in reasoning that must be considered in a philosophy or man and
hie operations.

He has shown throughout the reasoning process the importance

of the person and personal qualities, such

a. prudence, sens. of duty, and

familiarity wi:h a particular subjec,-matter.
reasoning in the Grammar

£!

As a whole, Newman's theory of

Aasent is • valuable contribution to philosophy.
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